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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of Mergers and Acquisitions announcements on shareholders wealth of 
acquirers in Singapore. In detail, this thesis will study the stock performance in response to M&A 
announcement under three time intervals: pre-announcement period (from day 5 to day 2 prior to 
announcement day), announcement period (including 1 day prior to announcement day and 
announcement day) and post-announcement period (from day 1 to day 5 after the announcement). The 
methodology to investigate this problem of interest is event study. The sample used in this study includes 
165 M&A transactions taken place from 2000 to 2007 in Singapore market. Proxy of the market returns 
for the sample is Singapore Stock Exchange All Share (SGP). The result shows that M&A announcement 
will affect the shareholder value of acquirers. It is evidenced that during the announcement period from 
one day before until the day M&A announcements are actually made, shareholders of acquirers will 
receive significant positive abnormal returns. In addition, this thesis also examines different determinants, 
which may affect the abnormal returns of acquirers to identify their relationships. They are cross-
border/domestic M&As, methods of payment and directions of mergers. Results show that those 
determinants do have positive impacts on stock performance of acquirers in particular periods.  
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Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions, hereafter UHIHUUHGDV³0	$´, are becoming more popular. Companies 
normally decide to engage in M&A to get competitive advantage, to improve efficiency and to enhance 
growth (Cheng et.al, 2007). A common view of M&A transactions is that they enable companies to get 
more benefits from the combined companies than total value of individual companies before M&A 
engagement. The benefit can be obtained from optimization of allocation of assets, increase market 
competition ability, expand corporate scale and create shareholder wealth. M&As now are not only 
interesting to companies, but also attract government in local economies. 
M&A originates for more than four decades, and becomes very common with developed countries in 
North American and European markets such as U.S. or U.K. However it only becomes popular for Asian 
markets since 1997, after the Asian financial crisis originated from Thailand and the smash of IT bubbles 
in 2000 (Wong et al., 2009). M&A activities in European and North American markets now are entering 
the mature stage. Nevertheless, M&A activities in Asian market are still in infant stage. That is why; there 
are many studies about M&A activities for European and North American markets; but only few studies 
conducted for Asian market. Therefore, that raises a need to conduct a research for this market. Moreover, 
there are two important differences when comparing US and developed countries with Asian emerging 
economies. Firstly, US develops a strong legal system to protect the benefits of shareholders and welfare 
of consumers, while emerging economies have a poor legal system and weak enforcement of existing 
laws (La Porta et.al,1999). Secondly, the differences in culture and governance cause differences in 
organizational structures of companies (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Denis and McConnell, 2003). As a 
result of these differences, those hypothesis and results obtained from studies of developed countries 
might not be able to represent for Asian markets. These reasons inspire me to conduct a research on M&A 
activities in Asian market to examine the validity of the hypothesis and previous studies on this market. 
Most empirical studies conclude that M&A announcements would create value for shareholders of target 
companies and combined companies. Some of those studies can be listed are Frederikslust, et.al (1999), 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) or Schwert (1996), etc. On the contrary, the impacts to shareholders of 
acquirers are mixed. Some empirical studies of such as Wong, et.al (2009), Bradley, et.al (1988) found 
that M&A announcement would generate statistically significant positive abnormal returns to acTXLUHUV¶
shareholders. On the other hand, a few studies show that M&A announcements will cause a negative or 
zero abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers such as Sirower (1994), Morck, et.al (1990) or De 
Bruijin, et.al (1994), etc.  
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There are two issues currently existing. They are there are few studies about M&A activities for Asian 
market and the shareholder value of acquiring companies in M&A deals as a result of M&A 
announcements are still unclear. These two reasons inspire me to carry out a research about value of 
DFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV in an Asian country. In detail, this thesis will use a sample of acquirers in a 
specific country in Asia, which is Singapore, to figure out whether announcement of M&A will generate 
value for DFTXLUHUV¶ shareholders. The reason I choose this country because it is a well developed and the 
biggest stock market in South East Asia, where I am living.  
Previous researchers have conducted their studies for either long run or short run. In this study, I will 
conduct the research for the short run. In doing this, I can avoid the risk of cofounding events, with which 
long run studies usually face (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). On the other hand, studying short run effect of 
M&A announcement is interesting because share prices will reflect the expectation of shareholders about 
FRPSDQLHV¶SURVSHFWLYH.  
Besides examining the impact of M&A announcement on stock performance in the short run, this thesis 
also examine the effects of factors, which may affect the performance of stocks. Previous studies have 
examine few determinants such as domestic/cross-border M&As (difference in DFTXLUHUV¶UHWXUQVGXHWR
domestic and cross-border target companies), methods of payment (effect of payment types RQDFTXLUHUV¶
returns) and direction of merger (explain any effect may have if acquirer and target are in the same 
industry or in different industries). Hence, we will re-examine those determinants to see whether they also 
impose impacts on Singapore M&A transactions.  
In this thesis, we hope to find the answers for the following research questions: 
x Will the M&A announcement create or destroy shareholder wealth of Singapore acquirers in 
short run? 
x How is the relationship between three factors (domestic/cross-border M&A, methods of 
payment, directions of mergers) and the performance of stocks?  
When answering these questions, hopefully, it will help shareholders of acquirers in deciding whether 
they should invest in those companies when M&A deals are announced. Moreover, it gives managers the 
idea of whether or not companies should engage in M&A activities and ability to predict returns based on 
available information.  
The thesis is organized as follow. Part 1 will discuss definition of M&As and motives for M&A activities. 
Part 2 is about literature reviews and hypothesis development. Part 3 describes the procedure of gathering 
the sample and methodology, which is used to process the data. Part 4 includes data description and 
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presents the results after applying methodology. Part 5 will report the obtained result. The last part is used 
to make conclusion on those obtained results.    
Theories, Literature review and Hypothesis development 
1. Definitions for M&A and motives for M&A activities 
a. Definitions of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Merger is a transaction when two companies decide to combine their operations. As a result of a merger 
transaction, two individual companies cease to exist and a new combined company is created. Acquisition 
is a transaction where one company takeovers the operation of another company. The company, which is 
DFTXLUHGLVFDOOHG³WDUJHWFRPSDQ\´DQGWKHFRPSDQ\ZKLFKDFTXLUHWKHRWKHUFRPSDQ\LVFDOOHG
³DFTXLUHU´7KHWDUJHWFRPSDQ\LVWKHUHIRUHEHFRPHDSDUWRIWKHDFTXLUHU 
In maQ\VWXGLHVWKHWHUP³PHUJHUV´DQG³DFTXLVLWLRQV´DUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\VLQFHWKHQHWUHVXOWLV
often the same (Sherman and Hart, 2006). Moeller at.al (2004) defines Mergers and Acquisitions as a 
transaction in which two individual business entities having separate ownership combine and operate as 
one entity after the transaction. Because of that, M&As in this thesis will be used interchangeably as 
indicating all transactions in which the businesses of any two companies will be combined through the 
purchase the majority of shares or a merged activity. 
In theoretical aspect, an M&A deal normally indicates that the controlling interest amount to 50% of 
voting shares plus one in the newly formed business (Ma, et.al, 2009). Ma, et.al (2009) also define 
controlling interest as the case where a shareholder (or a group of shareholders) holds a sufficient number 
of voting shares so that no coalition of shareholders can oppose a motion successfully. In practical aspect, 
a controlling interest is much less than that because it is hardly that 100% of shareholders will be in 
elections when shareholding is dispersed.  
This thesis will only focus on the majority M&A deals. In that sense, this thesis follows definition of 
M&A transactions of Moeller et al. (2004), saying that a M&A deal is a deal from which a combination 
of two individual entities takes place or the acquirer in the deal acquire from less than 50% of the 
holdings to more than 50% or to 100% of stocks (or assets). Therefore, all transactions that satisfy one of 
the following definitions are included in the sample of this thesis. First, an M&A transaction is taken 
place when all assets of a company, subsidiary, division, or branch are acquired. Second, acquirers owed 
less than 50% of voting shares and are looking to acquire 50% or more, but less than 100% of voting 
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shares in the target companies. Last, two companies combine together or 100% of stocks of a private or 
public company are acquired.   
b. Motives for Mergers & Acquisitions 
Companies engage in M&A activities with the aim to improve their performance. However, not all M&A 
deals can exhibit improvements after M&As. There are several explanations for the M&A engagement 
decisions and the poor post-performance of companies:  
i. Neoclassical theory 
In modern finance theory, managers are responsible for maximizing shareholders wealth. Hence, a 
manager should only engage in an M&A transaction if the deal is able to create value for his shareholders. 
Managers will reject any M&A deal, which is unable to achieve this objective. Under this theory, a M&A 
transaction should generate economic gains to both companies or at least generate non-negative returns to 
add value for shareholders (Baradwaj et.al, 1992). In other words, M&A transactions should help 
companies create synergy. Synergy is achieved when the value of a post-merger company is greater than 
the combined value of each individual company before M&A engagement. As noted by Bruner (2004) 
³WUXHV\QHUJLHVFUHDWHYDOXHIRUVKDUHKROGHUVE\KDUYHVWLQJEHQHILWVIURPPHUJHUVWKDWWKH\ZRXOGEH
XQDEOHWRJDLQRQWKHLURZQ´Synergy can be categorized into two types, which are operating and 
financial synergy (Gaughan, 2011, p.133).    
Operating synergy can be achieved through revenue enhancement or cost-reduction. Revenue 
enhancement refers to new opportunities that both companies may have when they are combined. These 
opportunities are seen from sale or marketing point of view. For instance, by engaging into M&A 
transactions, companies are able to get benefits from reduced competition and higher market share. As a 
result, companies will have greater pricing power and earn greater margins and operating income. 
Operating synergy can come from M&A transactions between two companies with two functional 
strengths such as good product line and good marketing skills. It can also be achieved through the lend of 
RQHFRPSDQ\¶VFRPSXWDWLRQWRWKHXSFRPLQJSURGXFWOLQH5HYHQXHHQKDQFHPHQWLVPRUHGLIILFXOWWR
achieve rather cost reduction synergy, which will be discussed shortly, because it is harder to quantify and 
build it into valuation models (Gaughan, 2011, p.134). Cost reduction can be achieved through economies 
of scope, economies of scale, or reductions in assets (Porter, 1985). For example, economies of scale refer 
to the reduction in cost per unit by production of larger size or scale of products. In other words, if a 
company produces more products, the fixed costs will be spread over more units, and as a result, reduce 
the cost per unit. In addition, cost reduction can be achieved through specialization of labour and 
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management, efficient use of capital equipment, but this might not be possible if companies produce at 
low output levels (Gaughan, 2011, p.135) 
M&A transactions create financial synergies to combined companies in terms of higher cash flows or 
lower cost of capital. Financial synergies may help companies reduce default risk. If one company has a 
probability to go bankrupt, creditors will consider this company as a risky company and they will not 
want to provide capital for this company or may lend at a high interest rate. By engaging into a M&A deal 
with another solvent company, the solvent company may cover the decline in that FRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZ. 
As a result, the combined company might be saved from being default and save creditors from suffering 
losses. It is referred as debt coinsurance. The combined company would then be seen as less risky. As a 
result, M&A engagement would reduce borrowing costs and diversify equity risk for shareholders, 
according to Maquieira et.al (1998). Lewellen (1971) uses portfolio distribution theory to propose a 
rational for M&As, which is the coinsurance hypothesis. He explains that M&A transactions between two 
or more companies, whose cash flows are less than perfectly correlated, will reduce the probability of 
joint financial distress. Therefore, this will increase debt capacity for combined companies and lead to 
greater leverage. Consequently, combined companies can increase the benefits from tax shield and create 
additional values for shareholders.   
ii. Behavioural hypothesis:  
Under this hypothesis, agency and hubris theory play important roles. 
x Agency theory 
In contrast to neoclassical theories with the aim of maximizing the shareholder wealth, agency theory 
states that managers will act in the ways that maximize their own interests DQGHQJDJHLQ³HPSLUH
buildiQJ´. According to free cash flow theory, which is a part of agency theory, managers may invest free 
cash flows, which should be paid out as dividends to shareholders, into negative NPV projects such as 
acquisitions, if these projects can maximize their own interest (Jensen, 1986). This is because if managers 
pay cash to shareholders, it will reduce the power of managers by reducing the amount of resources over 
which managers have control. Moreover, Amihud & Lev (1981) and later Black (1989) argues that in 
conglomerate M&As, managers will face with employment risk because their earnings and employment 
DUHKLJKO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKFRPSDQ\µVULVN. Therefore, managers will engage in M&A transactions to 
reduce their risk rather than maximizing shareholder value. In addition, managers may prefer to maximize 
corporate JURZWKUDWKHUWKDQFRUSRUDWHYDOXHVLQFHWKHPDQDJHUV¶SURILWVsuch as salary, bonuses, 
promotions or status tend to increase in line with corporate size (Cheng, et.al, 2007). Firth (1991) 
conducted a test to find the relationship between executive reward and M&As. He found that if 
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shareholder value increases, the executive rewards will also increase. On the other hand, if shareholder 
value is destroyed, executive rewards still seem to gain from M&As. This research found an interesting 
point that managers seem to act for their own utility rather than for shareholders.   
x Hubris theory 
The third theory explaining the motives of companies in M&A engagement assumes that the managers 
are non-rational; they make mistakes when evaluating the target companies due to their over self-
confidence (Roll, 1986). Managers of acquirers over-estimate the value of the target companies; hence, 
they may pay higher premium to the target companies. Hence, the share prices of the target companies 
would increase, as these shareholders are ready to transfer their shares in response to high premium 
offered by acquirers. That would lead to a gain in the value of target companies. On the other hand, 
shareholders of acquirers would suffer a capital loss since they have to pay extra amount due to over-
estimation. Consequently, the drop in share price will drive down the value of acquirers. As a result, the 
higher gains of target companies are compensated by the lower gains of acquirers, which lead to 
combined effects being zero (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). 
There are several studies supporting the concept of hubris theory, which show evidences of overpayment 
made by acquiring managers. They are studies conducted by Dodd and Ruback (1977), Maquieria et.al 
(1998) or Sudarsanam et.al (1996), etc. 
The negative impacts of M&A announcements can be explained through two hypothesis of behavioural 
hypothesis. First, it may come from the fact that managers realize large personal gains, which can be 
obtained through empire building. With free cash flow, they are likely to engage in M&A transactions 
rather than paying out cash to shareholders, even there are few profitable investment opportunities 
(Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2007). Second, mangers may make mistakes when they evaluate the deals. 
Overvaluations are often observed in M&As of private-held companies. That is because the information 
about the private-held target companies is more difficult to get rather than if the target companies is 
public (Officer, Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2009).   
In sum, three motives discussed above will lead to different expectations about the abnormal returns to 
shareholders of target companies and acquirers. Under synergy hypothesis, abnormal returns are expected 
to be positive to shareholders of target companies and acquirers. Under agency and hubris theory, 
shareholders of acquirers are expected to experience negative abnormal returns, while shareholders of 
target companies are expected to experience positive abnormal returns. Therefore, shareholders of target 
companies seem to be more beneficial than shareholders of acquirers if companies decide to engage in 
M&As. 
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2. Literature review and Hypothesis development 
a. Impact of M&A announcement on shareholder wealth 
Existing evidence on Western market 
A number of studies have conducted to estimate the effects of M&A announcements on stock 
performance of acquirers and target companies. Most empirical studies agree that M&A announcements 
will generate significantly positive abnormal returns to shareholders of target companies. Some of those 
studies are Schwert (1996), Jarrel &Poulsen (1989). Using a sample including 1814 US takeovers in 
the period from 1975 to1991, Schwert (1996) found abnormal returns of 10.1 % for shareholders of target 
firms. Similarly, Jarrel &Poulsen (1989) reported abnormal returns equal to 28.99% to the shareholders of 
target companies when examining a sample of 526 M&A transactions of US firms in the period from 
1963 to 1986. Jensen & Ruback (1983) summarized 13 studies and they concluded that M&A 
announcements generate significant positive abnormal returns to shareholders of target companies. The 
increase in stock price of target companies is ranging from 16.7% to 34.1% surrounding M&A 
announcements.   
In addition to significantly gains for shareholders of target companies, most studies agree that combined 
companies will gain from M&A announcement as well. One of those studies is conducted by Moeller, et 
al. (2005). They investigated M&A transactions in the period from 1980 to 2001. They examined three-
day cumulative abnormal return for acquiring companies and found that there is positive cumulative 
abnormal return for shareholders of acquiring firms, except for 2 years out of 22 years analysed. The 
abnormal return synergy gain (the combined value of acquiring and target companies in percentage 
returns) is slightly positive. This finding is consistent with findings in some other studies conducted by 
Mulherin and Boone (2000); Servaes (1991); Bradley, et.al (1988). 
In contrast to the above findings for shareholders of target companies and combined companies, the effect 
of M&A announcements on shareholder wealth of acquirers are quite ambiguous. Some studies result that 
M&A announcement also create wealth to shareholders of acquirers. Dodd and Ruback (1977) conduct a 
study for 169 tender offers, which examines the abnormal returns for both target and acquirer companies 
around M&A announcement day. They split their sample into successful acquirers and unsuccessful 
acquirers. They found that shareholders of acquirers are beneficial from M&A announcement. If the deal 
was successful, it brings about 2.83% statistically significant for shareholders of acquirers. On the other 
hand, if the deal was unsuccessful, shareholders of acquirers earn a small insignificant abnormal return of 
0.58%. This finding is later supported by Asquith (1983), which found a 0.7% and 3.48% abnormal return 
to unsuccessful and successful acquirers respectively. In addition, Bradley et.al (1988) conduct their study 
12 
 
for US sample, including 161 tender offers. They concluded a significant abnormal return of 0.97% for 
shareholders of acquirers. On the other hand, some other studies show that M&A announcement will 
generate negative or insignificant abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers.  Franks et.al (1991) 
conduct a study for their sample including 399 US M&A transactions during the period between 1975 and 
1984. They found a small insignificant negative return (-1.02%) to shareholders of acquirers for their 
sample. Likewise, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report small negative abnormal returns for US acquirers 
during the period 1953 - 1993.   
Existing evidence on Asian market 
Wong (1999) studied M&A announcement effects on security prices of bidding companies with a sample 
consisting of all public companies in Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998, irrespective of whether the 
transactions are successful or not. The result shows a negative impact on the security prices and 
shareholders are considered as unable to gain their wealth from M&A announcement. Supporting for this 
finding, Mat-Nor (1993) conducts his research for M&A deals in Malaysia during the event window of 41 
days centred on the announcement day. He concludes that there is a negative effect around M&A 
announcement.  
On the other hand, Ma, et.al (2009) analysed M&A announcement effects on shareholder wealth in ten 
Asian countries. By examining 1477 M&A deals in 10 Asian emerging countries from 2000-2005, they 
found that M&A announcements create positive cumulative abnormal returns in different windows. Wang 
(2009) diGKHUVWXG\IRUOLVWHGFRPSDQLHV¶ stocks. She also got the result that both bidding and target 
firms earn positive returns from the M&A announcements. Wong and Cheung (2009) examine the impact 
of M&A announcement on their sample, which includes 658 M&A deals in China, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. They conclude that corporate takeover is seen as good news for the 
shareholders of bidding companies. In contrast, it is not seem to be good news for shareholders of the 
target companies. In addition, they found that abnormal return for shareholders of acquiring firms in the 
period after official announcement depends on the type of acquisitions. 
Different empirical evidences draw different conclusions. Hence, the impact of M&A announcement on 
value of shareholders of acquirers seems to be ambiguous. Therefore, it seems that we are unable to apply 
those results for M&A transactions in Singapore. Due to this reason, M&A announcement impact  on 
shareholder value in Singapore needs to be examined further. Most existing evidences show that 
shareholders of acquirers will likely experience negative or insignificant abnormal returns during M&A 
announcement day. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
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Hypothesis 1: Shareholders of acquirers receive negative or insignificant abnormal returns surrounding 
M&A announcement day. 
b. Determinants of stock performance 
i. Impact of Domestic/Cross-border M&A on stock performance 
Due to the explosion of globalisation, companies want to expand their business to many countries. One 
way, which can help companies easily enter into new markets, is engaging into M&A agreements with 
local companies since it may reduce barriers to entry into international markets. This kind of M&A is 
called cross-border M&As. In theory, cross-border M&A transactions are expected to generate value for 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶DFTXLUHUVVLQFHWKHDFTXLUHUVFDQH[SORLWWKHWDUJHWFRPSDQLHV¶UHVRXUFHVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJH
of market imperfection (Buckley and Casson, 1976 and Morck and Yeung, 1992). According to Morck 
and Yeung (1991,1992), Kang (1993), Markides and Ittner (1994); cross-border M&As will provide 
benefits of internalisation, synergy and risk diversification. Therefore, they are expected to create value 
for shareholders of both acquirers and target companies. In the contrary, from the perspectives of 
acquirers, they normally do not fully understand about the target country and target companies. This 
would potentially lead to unsuccessful M&A transactions and wrong valuation of target companies, 
especially in the case that those target companies have high level of intangible assets (Reuer et. al, 2004). 
Therefore, due to information asymmetry, acquirers pay higher bid premiums and acquisition costs, which 
will then benefit those target companies in short run and generate negative or zero wealth effect for 
shareholders of acquirers (Datta & Puia, 1995 and Reuer et. al, 2004). In addition, cross-border acquirers 
may face with more challenges than domestic ones such as differences in political and legal systems or 
social and cultural norms, language barriers and history as indicated by Shimizu et al., 2004. These 
differences may hinder the performance of cross-border companies and drive down the value of their 
shareholders.     
Chang and Chen (1995) examine 70 US target companies in cross-border M&As during three days 
surrounding the announcement day. By investigating in their share prices, they found that US target 
companies earn positive abnormal returns after being acquired by foreign companies. Agree with that 
finding, Harris and RavenScraft (1991) find significant higher positive abnormal returns for 1273 US 
target companies from 159 cross-border acquisitions than domestic M&As in the period from 1970 to 
1987. Eun et. al (1996) examine abnormal returns for shareholders of US target companies from 1979-
1990. They found a significant positive abnormal return of 37.02%. Hence, these empirical evidences 
support for the belief that cross-border M&As generate positive abnormal returns for shareholders of 
target companies as similar as domestic M&As do. Moreover, Harris and RavenScraft (1991) find that 
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cross-border M&$VHYHQJHQHUDWHKLJKHUVLJQLILFDQWO\SRVLWLYHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQIRUWDUJHWFRPSDQLHV¶
shareholders than for domestic M&As. 
On the contrary, whether the abnormal return generated by international M&As create value for 
shareholders of acquirers has not been confirmed yet. Doukas and Travlos (1988, p.1166) examine the 
effect of cross-border M&As for 301 US acquiring frims engaged in M&A transactions during the period 
from 1975 to 1983. They found an insignificant positive abnormal return of about 2% for shareholders of 
acquirers in the period of 21 days, centred on the announcement day. Likewise, Mathur, et.al (1994, 
p.112) studied a sample of US data for the period from 1984 to 1988, they showed that foreign bidders 
generate insignificantly negative cumulative abnormal return in all three time intervals (-1,0), (+2,+6) and 
(+1,+15) day period. Eun et.al (1996) found a significant negative abnormal returns for US acquirers of -
1.2%. Conn (2003, p.1) reviewed 15 studies for US and UK M&A transactions. He reports a dominance 
of negative or zero cumulative abnormal return for acquirers. Corhay & Rad (2000) examined 
international M&As using a sample including foreign M&A transactions by Dutch companies during the 
period from 1990 to 1996. Their results report small negative abnormal returns, but insignificant to 
acquirers engaged in transactions for target companies located in Europe; while M&A transactions, which 
target companies are in the US, show significant abnormal returns of 4.83% to the Dutch acquirers at the 
time of announcement. In a study by Moeller & Schlingemann (2005), they investigate UK and US 
acquirers and found that domestic announcements generate more wealth as compared to cross-border 
announcements. 
Once again, the impact on shareholder value of acquirers as a result of domestic or cross-border M&As 
surrounding M&A announcement is still ambiguous and needs to be examined further. Follow most of 
previous studies, we suppose that cross-border M&A announcements will create negative or insignificant 
abnormal returns and domestic M&A announcements will produce positive abnormal returns for 
shareholders of acquirers. 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-border M&As generate negative or zero abnormal returns to shareholders of 
acquirers, while positive abnormal returns are expected from domestic M&A transactions. 
ii. Impact of means of payment on stock performance 
Acquiring companies have three methods of payment for the target companies. They can pay target 
companies in cash or shares or a combination of them. In a cash purchase, acquirer will make an offer and 
acquire shares of target companies, in return pay them in cash. In share swap, the acquirers will acquire 
the shares from shareholders of the target companies and in return offer them their own shares. Choosing 
any kind of those methods may affect the performance of combined firms. Myers and Majluf (1984), 
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Fishman (1989) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), based on asymmetric information, suggest that an 
acquirer will pay the target companies in shares if they believe their shares are overvalued or there is high 
XQFHUWDLQW\RQWKHWDUJHW¶VYDOXH,QFRQWUDVWWKH\PD\XVHFDVKWRSD\target companies if they believe 
WKHLUVKDUHVDUHXQGHUYDOXHGRUWKHUHLVKLJKXQFHUWDLQW\RQWKHDFTXLUHU¶VRZQYDOXH 
Huang and Walking (1985) provide reasons for preferring cash offers. First, using stock offer will 
contribute to dilution of reported earnings and welfare of shareholders. Second, in real market, cash offer 
is faster and more certain. The reason is if acquirers use stock offer, they need to wait for several months 
to get approval from Securities and Exchange Commission. Hence, it will slow down the progress of 
M&A transactions and increase the uncertainty of the stock market. Nevertheless, given acquirers have 
limited cash and liquid assets, cash offer will normally require debt financing. Debt financing, therefore, 
create financial distress for the firms and may limit cash flows for other future investments. As a result, it 
will DIIHFWWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶YDOXH. In that sense, cash offer is only suitable for small M&A transactions or 
those companies, which have abundant cash. Moreover, according to Rappaport and Sirower (1999), 
offering cash as a mean of payment, acquiring shareholders are taking entire risk that expected synergy 
value will not materialize. Meanwhile, with transactions financed by stocks, this risk is shared with 
selling shareholders according to the percentage of combined company that acquiring and selling 
shareholders own.   
Wansley et. al (1983) test for difference in returns for target companies between using cash or stocks to 
finance for M&A transactions. They found that those target companies using cash finance would gain, on 
average, 33.54% abnormal returns around M&A announcements. Meanwhile, target companies using 
stock finance receives only 17.47% abnormal returns. Similarly, Huang & Walking (1987) in their 
study, document that an average abnormal return of 29.3% is realized for target companies in M&A 
transactions using cash finance, while only 14.4% abnormal return is recorded for M&A transactions 
using stock finance. Moreover, they also find that M&A transactions using mixed payment will bring 
about 23.3% abnormal returns for shareholders of target companies. Consequently, target companies 
seem to be more beneficial in M&A transactions financed by cash than those financed by stocks or mixed 
offers.  
Most of empirical studies conclude that acquirers using cash offer will generate better returns for 
shareholders than those using stock offer. Travlos (1987) documented a significant difference between 
cash and stock M&As when investigate 60 acquirers. Acquirers using stock offer experience a significant 
negative cumulative abnormal return of -1.47%, while acquirers using cash offer earn an insignificant 
positive of 0.24% cumulative abnormal return. Likewise, Brown & Ryngaert (1991) achieve the same 
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result when examining 268 M&A transactions. They reported an insignificant positive abnormal return of 
0.06% to M&A transactions with cash offers, while a significant negative abnormal return of -2.74% with 
stock offers. The mixed offer between cash and stock generate a significant positive abnormal return of 
2.48%. Wansley et.al (1983) studied 203 companies listed in the Federal Trade Commission large merger 
series in the period from 1970 to 1978. They found that cumulative average abnormal return generated for 
acquirers of cash mergers are 11% greater than that of stock mergers. The study of Huang and Walking 
(1985) also supports to this finding.     
Despite many studies indicates the underperformance of stock offer in relation to cash offer, the number 
RI0	$WUDQVDFWLRQVXVLQJVWRFNRIIHULQFUHDVHFRQVLGHUDEO\DQGEHFRPHPRUHSRSXODUVLQFH¶V,W
raises concerns that current hypothesis is no longer valid. Indeed, Chang (1998) examines returns of 
acquirers around the announcement day of a takeover proposal when target companies are privately held. 
He concludes that there were no abnormal returns for bidders using cash finance, but positive abnormal 
returns for bidders using stock offer. Mushidzhi and Ward (2004) studied the impact of 49 acquisitions in 
the period from 1998 to 2002 for those acquirers listed on JSE. They concluded that there is no significant 
difference for shareholders of companies financing the transactions by cash or shares. 
Due to this variation, we need further study for the impact of methods of payment on shareholder value of 
acquirers surrounding M&A announcement day in Singapore. Following those results obtained from the 
most of previous empirical studies, it is expected that cash offer will generate positive abnormal returns, 
while other methods of payment will generate negative abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers. Our 
hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3: Acquirers with cash payment in M&A transactions will generate positive abnormal returns, 
while those with other methods of payment will generate negative abnormal returns for their 
shareholders 
iii. Impact of direction of M&As on stock performance 
If the acquirer and target company operate in a similar line of business, this M&A transaction is classified 
as horizontal M&A. In horizontal M&A, positive abnormal returns are generally recognized due to the 
possibilities for synergy. The expected value can come from improvement from management and 
operation (Eriksson & Hogfeldt, 1998). Besides that, market theory states that horizontal M&A can help 
combined companies save costs and enter into new market to make use of overcapacity and to reduce 
competition (De Jong, 1998).  
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Vertical M&A is the combination between two companies at different stages of production 
(Brealey,2008, p.883). The acquirer will acquire backward in its source of raw materials or forward in the 
direction of ultimate consumer. With vertical M&As, companies can reduce costs through backward 
merger, and earn higher margins through forward merger. However, according to Morck et. al (1990), 
synergy effects are hardly realized because they lack economies of scale and there are some problems of 
integration. Therefore, shareholders of vertical M&As are expected to experience negative abnormal 
returns. 
Conglomerate M&As are transactions combining two companies in unrelated lines of businesses 
(Brealey,2008, p.883). The motive for this type of M&As is diversification. Managers want to spread the 
risks by being active in different markets. This type of M&A are expected to generate negative stock 
reactions because shareholders of acquirers can spread their risks by themselves without incurring any 
cost, which arises from M&As. Therefore, empirical evidences suggest that conglomerate M&A 
transactions provide the lowest returns for shareholders because no synergy will be realized (Morck et.al, 
1990). Berger and Ofek (1995) found that the average loss in value from diversification M&As is about 
13-15%.  
Some empirical studies support that the degree of industry relatedness between acquirer and target 
companies is positively correlated with returns. Bosveld, Meyer and Vorst (1997) examine Dutch M&A 
transactions in the period from 1979 to 1995. They find both acquirer and target companies show positive 
CAR in horizontal M&A transactions. Maquieira, Megginson and Nail (1998) report insignificant 
negative returns to shareholders in conglomerate M&As, while a significant positive abnormal returns in 
non-conglomerate M&As.    
Shareholders of acquirers normally will receive positive abnormal returns as a result of M&A 
announcements if the target companies are in a similar line of business as acquirers; while receive 
negative or insignificant abnormal returns if M&A transactions are vertical or conglomerate. Therefore, I 
am also expected a positive abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers in horizontal M&As and 
negative abnormal returns in vertical and horizontal M&As for my sample.  
Hypothesis 4:Horizontal M&A transactions will generate positive abnormal returns, while vertical and 
conglomerate M&As create negative abnormal returns for acquirers¶VKDUHKROGHUV. 
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Data and Methodology 
1. Data selection 
This thesis investigates the impacts of M&A announcements on the value of shareholders of acquirers in 
Singapore during the period from 2000 to 2007. Therefore, this thesis will use the sample of M&A 
transactions in Singapore market downloaded from Bloomberg, which is a large database for M&A deals. 
Criteria for M&A transactions to be included in the sample are: 
- M&A deals in Singapore market which are announced during the period between 01/01/2000 and 
31/12/2007 
- All M&A deals included in the sample must be completed. Any deal, which has not been 
completed, was removed from the sample. 
- Acquirers must have their shares listed on the stock exchange 
After downloading data from Bloomberg, we do some filters for preliminary sample: 
- Financial institutions such as banks or insurance companies are excluded from the sample due to 
the fact that these financial institutions have differences in accounting and regulations compared 
to traditional companies. 
- We will focus our study on majority M&As. That means the acquirers must acquire 50% or 
higher of the shares in the target companies in each deal to be included in the sample. 
- Announced values of M&A transactions must be available and any transaction, whose value is 
less than S$1m, is excluded from the sample.  
- Any acquirers, which engaged in more than one M&A deal during one year, were eliminated to 
avoid confounding events. Empirical evidence shows that capital gains are larger in multiple 
M&As (Jarrel and Poulsen, 1988; Bradley et al, 1988). 
- All M&A transactions, which lack of ISIN information (International Securities Identification 
Number) for acquirers, are eliminated from the sample. 
- Information about methods of payment, country of both acquirer and target companies, and 
industry group must be available for the second part of this thesis, which investigate the 
UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQSRWHQWLDOGHWHUPLQDQWVDQGDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVIRUDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV. 
- Acquirers, who do not have 205-day share prices before the announcement day and 5 days after 
announcement day, will be removed from the sample. 
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- Some of M&A announcements in this sample are made during days when the stock market is not 
traded. Therefore, there are missing data for those days. As proposed by Peterson (1989), these 
announcement days have been chosen to the following day when the stock market is opened.  
In order to examine the reaction of 6LQJDSRUHDFTXLUHUV¶stock prices against the M&A announcement, we 
need to collect the daily share prices of Singapore acquiring companies. These daily share prices can be 
collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Thomson Reuters Datastream is a reliable and trusted 
source and one of the largest financial statistical databases ± including indices and economic data, 
fundamentals, estimates, etc. It provides quantitative data for over 175 countries and 60 markets. 
Information on daily returns on market is also collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Following 
study of Wong et.al (2009), Singapore Stock Exchange All Share (SGP) is employed as a proxy for 
market return. After filtering the sample, there are 165 M&A transactions remaining that satisfy all set 
criteria.  
2. Methodology 
7KHUHDUHVRPHPHWKRGRORJLHVWRPHDVXUHWKH0	$¶VSURILWDELOLW\7ZRPRVWFRPPRQZD\V are event 
studies and accounting studies. Event studies examine the abnormal returns that shareholders may earn in 
the period surrounding the M&A announcement. Accounting studies are based on the financial statements 
or accounting numbers of acquirers and target companies to identify whether there is any impact after 
M&A engagement. However, this methodology is less common when evaluating the effects of M&A 
announcement on shareholder wealth surrounding announcement day than event studies due to several 
reasons.  
According to Bishop et.al (1987), it takes several years for financial effects of M&A transactions to be 
reflected in accounting figures and hence accounting figures should be examined over a long period of 
time. This means that accounting method cannot identify the effect of M&A announcements on 
shareholder wealth in several days or weeks surrounding announcement day. Moreover, different 
companies may use different accounting techniques, so the use of accounting method to measure 
abnormal returns is questionable (Dodd, 1976). For example, some companies may use cash basis to 
record their income and expenses, while other companies may use accruals basis to record these variables. 
Therefore, the results may be different from each other and are not comparable. In addition, managers can 
manipulate accounting data. Supporting this point, Healy et.al. (1992) states that accounting data can be 
influenced by managerial decisions. Hence, using accounting data to examine the effect of M&A may not 
give a true and fair view. Lastly, accounting figures are historical data, which record all activities in the 
past. It does not reflect the expectation of shareholders about the impacts of M&A announcements in the 
20 
 
future. Hence, these figures neither reflect real asset values nor represent the market value of a company 
(Bishop et.al, 1987).  
Event studies are more common in use than accounting studies to measure the impacts of M&A 
announcement in the short run. The reason why this methodology receives support from researchers is 
that the event can be dated precisely, so the share prices will react to this new information immediately. 
Moreover, this methodology reflects the expectation of shareholders about the future of companies. That 
is why; in this thesis, I will choose event study methodology developed by Brown and Warner (1985), 
which is the most popular way for studying share price reactions due to M&A announcements.  
Event study framework 
Event study methodology is a common method to measure the performance of companies as the result of 
an event. This event could be issues of new debts, earning announcements or M&A announcement, etc. 
The objective of event studies is to examine the impact of an event on the value of a firm, which can be 
measured by the change in stock prices. Event study methodology is a consistent and valid approach to 
measure the stock price reaction (Campbell et.al, 1997; and Thompson, 1995). Event study methodology 
uses the financial market data to measure whether the shareholders can earn abnormal returns due to a 
specific event. An abnormal return is the difference between the actual return observed and the expected 
return if the event does not occur (Peterson, 1989).  
This method is only appropriate with the assumption that market is efficient (McWilliams & Siegel: 
1997). In an efficient market, share price will reflect all the information immediately so that we are able 
to observe the impacts of the event to the share prices. Hence, any change in share prices will reflect 
expectations of shareholders about future cash flows. According to Pangarkar and Lie (2004), Singapore 
equity market is believed to satisfy this assumption. They mentioned that Singapore market has a strong 
regulatory framework since the early days of development. For example, it has banned market rigging and 
fraudulent practices since 1986. It adopt best practices, (e.g., mandatory audit committees since 1990), 
even before some developed countries. Additionally, it has high liquidity, and a well-developed foreign 
exchange market, which helps to access easily to foreign institutional buyers. Some previous studies, such 
as Lee et.al (1997), conclude that Singapore equity market can react quickly to new information such as 
merger announcement. As a result, they believe that Singapore market is efficient.  
Event study has two additional assumptions. This methodology assumes that there were no confounding 
effects during the event period. This assumption is crucial because if there are relevant events happening 
in the event period, it is hard to isolate the impact of the event of interest (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
The final assumption, on which event studies rely, is the event is unforeseeable. 
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This thesis will employ daily data as inputs for event study methodology and there is a problem relating 
to using daily data. When dealing with daily data, Brown and Warner (1985) note that this may raise the 
possibility that daily returns may not be normally distributed and exhibit serial dependence. However, 
they conclude that methodologies based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) PDUNHWPRGHODUH³ZHOO
VSHFLILHGXQGHUDYDULHW\RIFRQGLWLRQV´Panayides and Gong (2002); Davidson, Dutia and Cheng (1989) 
then confirmed this and concluded this method provide the most accurate measure of abnormal 
performance.  
The procedure of an event study methodology includes four steps. Firstly, we need to identify the event of 
interest, which is the impact of M&A announcements on stock prices in this thesis. Secondly, we need to 
identify the estimation, event windows. Thirdly, we will estimate the parameters Įȕ, which are used to 
calculate the expected returns, in the estimation window. Lastly, the abnormal returns are obtained by 
subtracting the normal returns from those observed returns during the event window. It is necessary to test 
whether those abnormal returns are significant different from zero. The most common test statistic to 
examine this is t test, which is conducted by Brown and Warner (1985). Additionally, a non-parametric 
generalized sign test developed by Cowan (1992) will be employed to test for significance.    
Estimation window is the time period, which is used to estimate the expected or normal returns (Peterson, 
1989). Length of estimation window varies across studies. Peterson (1989) and Armitage (1995) argue 
that the appropriate estimation period when dealing with daily studies should be between 100 and 300 
trading days. In this study, I will choose 200 days for the estimation window. Furthermore, MacKinlay 
(1997) indicates the estimation window should exclude event window, which will be discussed shortly, to 
avoid the event will influence the estimation of parameters. 
Event window is the period over which the security prices of companies involved in the event are 
examined (MacKinlay,1997). Ideally, it would be sufficient that event window constitutes only event day. 
However, in practice, event window usually last for a couple of days. Nevertheless, the numbers of days 
in the event window should not be long since long event window indicates that researcher do not believe 
in quickly reaction in share prices. That violates the first assumption of the event studies, which states that 
the share prices incorporates immediately any effect of the event into share prices. In addition, using long 
event window indicates that the event might be anticipated, which again violates the last assumption 
indicating that the event is unforeseeable. Moreover, the longer the event period, the risk of encountering 
confounding event increases. That is why; we need to find an appropriate event window in order to fully 
capture the impact of M&A announcement, but not violate assumptions of event study. According to 
Panayides and Gong (2002), event windows of 11 days can fully capture the effects of an event of 
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interest. Inspired of that, event window for this sample will include 11 days, centred by the announcement 
day (5 days prior to the M&A announcement and 5 days following the announcement date and 
announcement day). The reason I choose 5 days before the M&A announcement is in some previous 
studies such as Ma et.al (2009), they indicates that share prices are influenced by the rumour about the 
M&A before the official announcement is actually taken place. Hence, these 5 days are useful to detect 
any price movement due to the impact of any rumour. On the other hand, stock performance of acquirers 
during 5 days after M&A announcement are examined since the reaction to the M&A announcements can 
last for the next few days. That could be because an announcement may be made in one day, but financial 
press does not report it until the next day; or since the announcement is made after trading hours, so stock 
reaction may not be recognized until the next day.  
One advantage of studying the impact of M&A announcement in short run is that we do not need to 
control for size effect. Size of the companies is only important for studies of long run effects because 
failure to control size effect will lead to biased results (Gregory, 1997). 
Let us define the announcement day as t=0, the estimation window is from day t=T0 to t= T1, event 
window constitutes t=T1+1 to t=T2. The following diagram illustrates the timeline in this thesis: 
 
 
 
According to the timeline, the estimation window starts from T0= -205 to T1= -6, including 200 days. The 
event window starts from day T1+1= -5 to T2= +5, which constitutes 11 days centred on the event date. 
The event and estimation windows cannot be overlapped; otherwise, they will lead to a situation where 
both normal and abnormal returns will capture the effect of M&A announcement (MacKinlay, 1997) 
Calculation of abnormal return 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual returns and the expected returns in case that the 
event does not take place during the event window. The expected returns are defined as the normal return 
that the shareholders may earn if the M&A announcements have not occurred (MacKinlay, 1997). In 
order to estimate the abnormal returns, we need to estimate the expected returns if the event of M&A 
announcement had not occurred. There are three models, which are commonly used to estimate expected 
returns, which are Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), constant mean return and market models.  
Estimation window Event window 
T0 T1 T2 0 
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CAPM model is commonly used during the 1970s. In this model, expected return is determined by its 
covariance with the market portfolio (MacKinlay, 1997). However, this model requires risk-free rate of 
return to get the expected normal return, which can cause an obstacle, especially if we conduct the event 
study in developing countries, which has underdeveloped government-issued securities markets (Ma, 
Pagán & Chu, 2009). In addition, due to restrictions imposed by CAPM, the results might be sensitive 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Due to these reasons, CAPM method becomes less common. 
According to MacKinlay(1997), constant mean return is an improvement over the CAPM model. The 
constant mean return model assumes that return mean of a security will be constant through time. 
Constant mean return model determines the mean-adjusted return by subtracting the average return for 
stock i during the estimation period from observed returns during the event period. Nevertheless, this 
model does not control for the risk of the stocks or returns on the market portfolio over the event period. 
Therefore, this method will produce greater variance in abnormal returns as compared to the market 
model, which will be discussed shortly (Binder, 1998). The market model will remove the portion of 
return, which is related to the YDULDWLRQLQWKHPDUNHW¶VUHWXUQDQGDVDUHVXOWUHGXFHWKHYDULDWLRQLQWKH
abnormal return. Thus, it can increase the ability to detect the impacts of events. Market model seems to 
be an improvement over mean-adjusted return model and even CAPM model. That is why; in this study, I 
will utilise market model to estimate abnormal returns during the event window. 
The market model assumes a stable linear relationship between market return and security return 
(MacKinlay, 1997).To estimate the expected returns using market model, we apply the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) to estimate the relationship between return of the security and the return of the market:    ܴ௜ ?௧ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠ ?௧൅ ߝ௜ ?௧ 
     
Where: ܴ௜ ?௧ ± Rate of return of security i at time t ܴ௠ ?௧ - Return of the benchmark market index at time t ߝ௜ ?௧ ± Random zero-mean disturbance term ߙ௜,ߚ௜ - Parameters of market model to be estimated 
The daily closing rate of returns are calculated by 
24 
 ܴ௜ ?௧ൌ ሾሺ ௧ܲ െ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ܦ௜ ?௧ሻȀ ௧ܲିଵሿݔ ? ? ?  
Where ܴ௜ ?௧ ± Rate of return of security i at time t 
௧ܲ ± The closing price on security i at time t 
௧ܲିଵ - The closing price on security i at time t-1 ܦ௜ ?௧ ± Cash dividend on security i on the ex-dividend day concerned 
The daily closing rates of market index are calculated as: ܴ௠ ?௧ൌ ሾሺܲ௠ ?௧െ ܲ௠ ?௧ିଵሻȀܲ௠ ?௧ିଵሿݔ ? ? ?  
Where, ܴ௠ ?௧ - Rate of return on the market at time t ܲ௠ ?௧ ± The closing market index at time t ܲ௠ ?௧ିଵ ± The closing market index at time t-1 
As defined above, the abnormal return is the difference between the observed return in the market and the 
normal return or expected return if the event had not occurred. Therefore, the abnormal return is 
calculated as follow: ܣܴ௜  ?௧ൌ ܴ௜ ?௧െ ߙ௜ െ ߚ௜ܴ௠ ?௧ 
Where, ܣܴ௜ ?௧ ± Abnormal return of stock i at time t 
In order to capture the total effect of stock movements during the period, we will estimate the average 
abnormal return (AAR) across all securities for any individual time period t  
ܣܣܴ௧ ൌ  ?ܰ෍ ܣܴ௜ ?௧ே೟௜ୀଵ  
Where: ܣܣܴ௧  ± Average abnormal return across all securities for individual time period t 
 ܰ  - Number of companies in the sample 
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Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ?ሺ௧ଵ ?௧ଶሻൌ ෍ ܣܴ௜௧௧ଶ௧ୀ௧ଵ  
Where:ܥܣܴ௜  ?ሺ௧ଵ ?௧ଶሻ- Cumulative abnormal return in an interval starting from time t1 to t2 
 
t1,t2 ± the first day and the last day of the event period 
In order to estimate cumulative effect of the event, we estimate cumulative average abnormal returns 
through time and across all securities (CAAR). According to Cheng, et.al (2007), CAARs will provide a 
clear indication of the direction and magnitude for aggregated stock price movement of acquirers during 
the event window.  
ܥܣܣܴሺ௧ଵ ?௧ଶሻൌ ෍ ܣܣܴ௧௧ଶ௧ୀ௧ଵ  
Where t1, t2 ± the first day and last day respectively of an event period in which ܣܣܴ௧  are accumulated. 
Univariate testing 
Finally, we want to test whether the abnormal returns are due to chance or because of M&A 
announcements. To do that, we will carry parametric and non-parametric tests on our abnormal returns. 
Most statistical tests contain some drawbacks or potential problems. Therefore, it is agreed by many 
empirical research that we should use both parametric and non-parametric tests and not only rely on any 
particular test. In doing this, results from different tests can support each other and overcome drawbacks. 
In this thesis, I will use parametric t test developed by Brown and Warner (1985) and non-parametric 
generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) to test this hypothesis.  
Parametric test 
x T test by Brown and Warner (1985) 
This thesis will employ the test statistic of Brown and Warner (1985). This test is based on the standard t 
test to infer whether cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, the null and alternative hypothesis of the test are: 
   H0: CAAR(t1,t2) = 0 
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   H1: CAAR(t1,t2)   
The numerator of parametric t-test measures the impact of M&A announcement relative to expected 
return when the event had not occurred. The denominator of t-test takes account of scaling the number 
using estimated variance. In this sense, the test statistic is calculated by dividing the CAAR by its 
estimated standard error. Test statistic for CAAR
 
is estimated as: 
׎௖ ൌ ܥܣܣܴȀሾܵܧሺ݊ሻଵଶሿ 
Where  n is the number of trading days over which the average abnormal return is calculated. 
SE is the standard deviation of average abnormal returns during the estimation window and is 
calculated as: 
ܵܧ ൌ ෍ሾሺܣܣܴ௧ െ ܣܣܴതതതതതതሻଶȀሺܶ െ  ?ሻሿଵȀଶ்ଶ்ଵ  
Where: T1, T2 is the first day and the last day of estimation window 
 T is the number of days in the estimation window 
 ܣܣܴതതതതതത is the average abnormal return across all the securities during the estimation window and is 
estimated as: 
ܣܣܴതതതതതത ൌ  ?ܶ ෍ ܣܣܴ௧்ଶ௧ୀ்ଵ  
If ׎௖ > t value, we reject the null and conclude that M&A announcement will impose impacts on 
shareholder value for acquirers. The significance of test statistic of the result also means the security 
return does not depend on the random factor and it is affected by the announcements of M&A.  
The t-test makes four assumptions about the parameters of population. Firstly, observations must be 
drawn from normal distribution. Secondly, the they must be independent. Thirdly, they must have a 
constant variance, and finally an expected value of abnormal return equals zero. Of which, the assumption 
about distribution of observations is critical for the robustness of parametric tests in event studies (Keller; 
2005). Furthermore, Bartholdy et. al (2007) note that under null hypothesis, skewness and kurtosis of 
observations should equal to zero. That is because positive kurtosis would cause fall rejection frequencies, 
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meanwhile skewness which does not equal to zero would cause rejection frequencies which are different 
for positive and negative events.    
Non-parametric test 
In addition to parametric test, I will use a non-parametric test, which is the Generalized sign test 
introduced by Cowan (1992). The reason I choose both parametric and non-parametric test because 
parametric test makes an assumption about the nature of population from which the observations are 
drawn (Siegel, 1957). It assumes that the abnormal returns are normally distributed. If this assumption 
holds, the parametric tests are powerful and can outperform the non-parametric tests. In contrast, if the 
assumption is violated, the non-parametric tests are preferable because non-parametric tests make no 
assumptions about the population (Siegel, 1957). The fact that non-parametric tests do not make any 
assumptions about security returns make them essential in this sample because this thesis uses daily 
returns of securities, which normally exhibit non-normal distribution. 
In addition, Cowan (1992) indicates that when thin trading stocks are included in the sample, it is likely 
that the assumptions characterizing parametric tests are likely violated. Therefore, parametric test may be 
misleading and non-parametric tests are preferable.  
Moreover, event-induced volatility is very common in many event types including M&A transactions. As 
noted by Brown and Warner (1985), the increase of variance surrounding the event day will lead to 
misspecification of the standard parametric tests. They will report stock reaction more often than expected 
(Type I error). Therefore, non-parametric tests dominate parametric tests in this situation because non-
parametric tests do not use return variances, hence will perform better in case variance increases.      
x Generalized sign test by Cowan (1992) 
³*HQHUDOL]HGVLJQWHVWH[DPLQHVZKHWKHUWKHQXPEHURIVWRFNVZLWKSRVLWLYHFXPXODWLYHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQV
LQWKHHYHQWZLQGRZH[FHHGVWKHQXPEHUH[SHFWHGLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDEQRUPDOSHUIRUPDQFH´as pointed 
out by Cowan (1992). That is why; the test is able to take account of the asymmetry of return distribution 
and dominates parametric t test. Cowan (1992) also mentions that this test is well specified for event 
windows from one to eleven. This test is powerful and become more powerful as the length of CAR 
window increases. Our sample includes eleven days, centred on the event day, in the event window and 
hence fit exactly the length of time this test is well-specified. Additionally, this test is shown to be robust 
to event-induced volatility because generalized sign test only take account of the sign, not magnitude of 
abnormal returns.  
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In Generalized sign test, the probability of observing positive or negative abnormal returns is estimated 
based on actual abnormal returns from estimation window. Under the null hypothesis that there is no 
abnormal returns due to M&A announcement, the number of positive abnormal returns in the event 
window is equal to the number of expected positive abnormal returns in the absence of the event. 
According to Cowan (1992), the generalised sign test is calculated as: 
ܼீ ൌ ݓ െ ݊݌ ?ሾ݊݌ ?ሺ ? െ ݌ ?ሻሿଵଶ 
Where  
݌ ? ൌ ?݊෍  ?݉௜ ෍ ௜ܵ௧భ்௧ୀ బ்ାଵ௡௜ୀଵ  
௜ܵ௧ ൌ ቄ ?݂݅ܣܴ௜௧ ൐  ? ?݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  
w is defined as the number of stocks in the event window, for which the CARi(t1,t2) is positive. ܣܴ௜௧  is defined as before 
n is the number of observations. ݉௜ is the number of non-missing returns in the estimation window for security i  
Multi-variable Testing 
A multi-variable analysis will allow us WRSHUIRUPUREXVWWHVWRQVKDUHKROGHU¶VYDOXHHIIHFWVThis thesis 
will employ OLS to establish the relationship between three factors (domestic/cross-border M&A, 
method of payment, directions of merger) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). From this model, 
we can develop a basis to predict the CAR from available information. 
The OLS model to examine the impacts of three factors on CAR is: ܥܣܴ௜  ?ሺ௧ଵ ?௧ଶሻൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܿݎ݋ݏݏܾ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜ ൅ ߚଶܿܽݏ݄௜ ൅ ߚଷݏܽ݉݁݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ ߝ 
Where: ߙ - Intercept ܿݎ݋ݏݏܾ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜ ± dummy variable that equals to 1 if the transaction is cross-border M&A and 0 
otherwise 
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 ܿܽݏ݄௜ - dummy variable that equals to 1 if the transaction is made in cash and 0 otherwise ݏܽ݉݁݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ - dummy variable that equals to 1 if acquirers and target companies are in the 
same industry, 0 otherwise. 
 ߝ ± residual term. 
Data description 
During the period from 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2007, our sample includes 165 M&A transactions in 
Singapore market. Table 1 reports the number of M&A transactions, total announced value and the mean 
values of M&A transactions each year from 2000 to 2007. There is a trend in the data. From table 1, there 
are few M&A transactions in Singapore market in 2000, only 6 cases in the year and total announced 
value amounts to S$2909 millions. That may be due to the effects of Asian financial crisis in 1997 
originated from Thailand, which is a neighbour of Singapore in South East Asia. The number of M&A 
transactions gradually increases correlated to years. In 2001, there are 16 transactions in this year and 
total announced value gain dramatically to around S$18,000. This significant gain is due to M&A 
transaction between Singapore Telecommunications Ltd and SingTel Optus Pty Ltd, whose total 
announced value amounts to over S$17,000. In 2002 and 2003, the number of M&A transactions 
increases to 20 transactions each year. Except for 2005 when the number of M&A transactions drops 
slightly to 18 cases, the amount of M&A cases from 2004 increases in every year after that and reaches 
the highest 31 cases in 2007. 
Table 1: Distribution of M&A transactions by year and announced total value each year 
    Year No of transactions Announced total value (S$mil) Average value (S$mil) 
2000 6 2909.08 484.85 
2001 16 18129.5 1133.09 
2002 20 731.03 36.55 
2003 20 1312.96 65.65 
2004 26 1774.38 68.25 
2005 18 1089 60.50 
2006 28 2960.47 105.73 
2007 31 1179.51 38.05 
Total 165 30085.93 182.34 
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Table 2 exhibits the number of M&A transactions under different three sub-samples, which are 
domestic/cross-border M&A, method of payment, direction of merger. As we can see from the table, 
there are 87 cross-border M&A transactions (52.7%) and 78 domestic M&A transactions (47.3%). We 
can see from this sample that in Singapore, more companies engage in cross-border M&A transactions 
than domestic transactions, but the difference is not large. In contrast, the number of transactions in two 
categories method of payment and industry exhibits a large gap. M&A transactions using cash seem to 
dominate transactions using stocks or combination of cash and stocks. There are 103 M&A cases, which 
use cash as a method of financing for M&A deals, amount to 62.42% of total number of deals; while there 
are only 34 deals using stocks to finance M&A deals, only 20.61% of total deals. The remaining 28 deals 
finance M&A deals by combination of cash and stocks, which count only 16.97% of total number of 
deals. Similarly, there are only 65 M&A transactions (39.4%) between two companies operating in the 
same industry group. Meanwhile, 100 M&A transactions (60.6%) are implemented between two 
companies in two different industry groups. It seems that acquirers in Singapore prefer acquiring 
companies operating in another industry group rather than in the same industry group.  
Table 2: Numbers of M&A transactions according to different determinants 
     
    No of transactions % 
 Cross-border Yes 87 52.73% 
 
 
No 78 47.27% 
 Method of payment Cash 103 62.42% 
 
 
Stock 34 20.61% 
 
 
Mixed 28 16.97% 
 Same industry Yes 65 39.39% 
 
 
No 100 60.61% 
  
Table 3 shows us the distribution of M&A transactions by industry. In our sample, the acquirers are 
categorized in 35 industry groups. Electronics is the industry that has the most M&A transactions (17 
deals) during eight years in the sample. Industries that have fewer M&A transactions as compared to 
electronics, but still occupy large proportions of M&A transactions during eight years are Commercial 
Services, Engineering & Construction, Computers and Food.  
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Table 3: Distribution by industry group 
   No Industry group No of transactions 
1 Beverages 1 
2 Building Materials 7 
3 Chemicals 1 
4 Closed-end Funds 1 
5 Commercial Services 12 
6 Computers 11 
7 Distribution/Wholesale 8 
8 Diversified Financial Services 2 
9 Electrical Compo&Equip 8 
10 Electronics 17 
11 Engineering & Construction 12 
12 Environmental Control 3 
13 Food 10 
14 Forest Products & Paper 2 
15 Healthcare-Products 1 
16 Healthcare-Services 1 
17 Holding Companies-Divers 6 
18 Home Furnishings 3 
19 Household Products/Wares 1 
20 Internet 4 
21 Lodging 4 
22 Machinery-Diversified 2 
23 Metal Fabricate/Hardware 2 
24 Mining 1 
25 Miscellaneous Manufacture 1 
26 Oil & Gas Services 6 
27 Packaging & Containers 2 
28 Pharmaceuticals 1 
29 Real Estate 9 
30 Retail 4 
31 Semiconductors 7 
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32 Shipbuilding 2 
33 Software 1 
34 Telecommunications 4 
35 Transportation 8 
  Total 165 
 
As we can see from table 4, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of three time intervals are not normally 
distributed. A normal distribution should be symmetric with skewness of zero and kurtosis equals three. 
However, skewness of CARs in this sample is much greater than zero and their kurtosis is also much 
greater than three. Therefore, it skews to the right and exhibits fat tails. Due to this reason, the 
assumptions of parametric tests are violated and hence bias from using parametric test is expected. As a 
consequence, non-parametric generalized sign test is more powerful and reliable than parametric t test. In 
other words, conclusions drawn should be mainly based on non-parametric test. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns 
  
      
  mean Median 
standard 
deviation skewness  kurtosis 
CAR(-5;-2) 0.0209943 -0.0004198 0.1059451 1.955161 12.6835 
CAR(-1;0) 0.0145273 0.0034029 0.0723069 1.445482 15.26759 
CAR(+1;+5) 0.0033138 -0.0024443 0.1439389 5.0615 48.25885 
      
Data analysis and discussion 
Figure 1: Average abnormal return in event window 
 
We will have a look on average abnormal return on each day first. As we can see from the figure 1, the 
average abnormal returns of acquirers are divided into three phases. The first phase is the period before 
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the M&A announcement is made, from day -5 to day -2, the abnormal returns fluctuate slightly. It goes up 
to 0.7856% from day -5 to day -4, and then drops to 0.2524% at day -3. From day -3 to day -2, AAR rise 
slightly again to 0.4687%. The second phase, from day -2 to day 2, records the most dramatically 
fluctuations of average abnormal returns. AAR gains sharply and reaches their peak of 1.4547% at day -1. 
However, after that, it starts to drop aggressively to -0.002% at the day the announcement is taken place 
(t=0). It indicates that the shareholders gain negative abnormal returns in the announcement day. 
Nevertheless, abnormal return recovers again and achieves 1.4% abnormal return for shareholders in 1 
day 1 after announcement day. After day t=1, the average abnormal return drops dramatically and shows 
negative returns to shareholders in the last phase from day +3 till the last day of the event window (t=+5).  
Table 5: Average abnormal returns of acquirers in event window  
Day AAR CAAR 
-5 0.5928% 0.5928% 
-4 0.7856% 1.3784% 
-3 0.2524% 1.6307% 
-2 0.4687% 2.0994% 
-1 1.4548% 3.5542% 
0 -0.0020% 3.5522% 
1 1.3700% 4.9222% 
2 0.4091% 5.3313% 
3 -0.6004% 4.7309% 
4 -0.6513% 4.0796% 
5 -0.1960% 3.8835% 
 
In general, we can recognise a positive abnormal return during the pre-announcement period and record a 
peak of AAR on day -1 (1.4548%). It indicates that stock market may have positive reactions to the 
announcement of M&A and there was a leakage of the information about M&A engagements before the 
announcement is actually made. In the announcement day, the sample exhibits a small negative average 
abnormal return on the day. However, on the next day, it starts to rise again. One possible reason for that 
can be some announcements may be made after trading hours. That is why; stock price cannot quickly 
react on the announcement day and need to wait until the next day to reflect the impact of M&A 
announcement. During the post-announcement period, the M&A announcement seems to have negative 
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effects on AAR of acquirers, but overall, shareholders still earn positive CAAR due to M&A 
announcement during the event window.  
To see the total effect of M&A announcement, we will examine the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) in different time intervals. The cumulative average abnormal returns are examined in 3 time 
intervals: pre-announcement period (-5;-2), announcement period (-1;0) and post-announcement period 
(+1;+5). Table 6 describes CAAR of acquirers during three periods. According to table 6, CAARs under 
all three time periods are positive.  
Shareholders of acquirers earn a positive CAAR of 2.10% during pre-announcement period. The positive 
return can be explained as investors are expected about the future performance of combined firms. 
7KHUHIRUHWKH\DUHZLOOLQJWRKROGPRUHVWRFNV$VDUHVXOWDFTXLUHUV¶VWRFNVLQFUHDVHLQSULFHDQG
generate abnormal returns to shareholders. However, this CAAR is not significant at 10% level. It seems 
that the M&A transactions were anticipated, however, the rumours or insider trading has little impacts on 
acquirers. Therefore, we conclude that M&A announcements do not affect abnormal returns for 
shareholders of acquirers during pre-announcement period. 
The abnormal returns are realized in the announcement period. From a day prior to announcement day to 
announcement day, shareholders of acquirers receive a positive CAAR of 1.45%. Parametric test does not 
result any significant value, however, non-parametric generalized sign test shows that this positive CAAR 
for the announcement period is significant at 1% level. For that reason, we can reject the null of no 
abnormal return for shareholders of acquirers during announcement period. Although this result is 
contrary to most UK and US empirical studies, it supports the conclusion from previous study for Asian 
market such as Ma et.al (2009). Their study indicates that CAARs for 10 Asian countries are positive and 
significant at 1% significant level. Other studies gives the same conclusions are Wong and Cheng (2009), 
Wang (2009) or Chi (2011). Therefore, M&A announcement seems to be good news for shareholders of 
acquirers in Singapore and generally for Asian markets. 
The CAAR for shareholders of acquirers in the post-announcement period is 0.33%. Both parametric t 
test and non-parametric generalized sign test show no significant result. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
null that M&A announcement generates no abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers during post-
announcement period. This result is consistent most previous studies for US or UK samples, indicating 
that CAAR will not generate any abnormal returns to shareholders of acquirers. We can see that CAAR 
obtained from post-announcement period is lower than pre- and announcement period. This shows that 
investors may overestimate the acquirers during pre- and announcement period. Hence, when more 
information such as financial information of related companies or terms and conditions of the proposal is 
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available or the performance of combined companies does not match the market expectations, those 
investors change their minds. As a result, they may sell their shares and bring down share prices.  
Table 6: CAARs of Acquirers  
  
     
Time interval CAAR (%) t-value Z-value   
Pre-announcement period 
   
(-5;-2) 2.10%             0.23  
            
1.18   
Announcement period 
   
(-1;0) 1.45%             0.22  
            
3.06  
 
***  
Post-announcement period 
   
(+1;+5) 0.33%             0.02  
            
0.86    
*** significant at 1% level 
 
 
In order to examine different factors that could help to explain abnormal returns, we will conduct further 
tests for sub-samples. We will examine in-depth the cumulative average abnormal returns of acquirers 
under three categories: domestic/cross-border M&As, methods of payment, direction of mergers to see 
the impacts of these factors on stock performance.  
Cross-border/Domestic M&A transactions 
We split our sample into two groups: cross-border and domestic M&As. Cross-border M&A group 
includes all transactions in which acquirers in Singapore acquire target companies in other countries. 
Domestic M&A group includes all transactions in which both acquirer and target companies are operating 
in Singapore. Our sample includes 87 cross-border and 78 domestic M&A transactions. Table 7 shows 
CAARs that shareholders of acquirers earn before, during and after M&A announcements, distributed by 
whether the transactions are cross-border or domestic M&A.     
From table 6, during three time intervals, both domestic and cross-border M&A transactions generally 
generate positive CAARs. During pre-announcement period, both cross-border and domestic M&As 
generate CAARs of 1.96% and 2.26% respectively. Nevertheless, both parametric and non-parametric 
tests indicate that they are not statistically significant different from zero.  
In the announcement period, shareholders of acquirers earn 0.5% CAAR in cross-border M&As and 
receive 2.52% CAAR LIWKHWDUJHWFRPSDQLHVDUHLQVLGHWKHDFTXLUHUV¶FRXQWU\. Parametric t test indicates 
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the CAARs during announcement period for both domestic and cross-border M&As are not significantly 
different from zero, however, non-parametric test indicates significant CAARs for both cross-border and 
domestic M&A transactions. If the target companies are outside Singapore, CAAR generated is 
significant at 10%. If the target companies are in Singapore, shareholders of acquirers receive significant 
positive CAAR at 1% level. Therefore, we can conclude that the country of target companies impose 
HIIHFWVRQWKHYDOXHRIDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV during the announcement period. 
Moreover, domestic M&A deals seem to generate higher abnormal returns than cross-border M&A 
transactions during pre- and announcement period. Cross-border M&A transactions are not being seen as 
attractive to shareholders of acquirers during these two periods. This finding is in line with those studies 
of Moeller & Schlingemann (2004), Conn et al. (2005), Bertrand & Zitouna (2005) and Martynova & 
Renneboog (2006), stating that domestic M&A transactions generate more positive returns than cross-
border M&As. One of the reason could be shareholders are doubt about the future of acquirers. As 
acquiring a foreign company, acquirers must face with many problems such as culture differences, 
government, regulations in that country. Thus, it is more risky to acquire target companies in other 
countries than to acquire target companies in the home country, where acquirers already have knowledge 
about it. As a result, acquirers have higher probability to improve performance after M&A engagement 
and generate value for shareholders in domestic M&As. Hence, shareholders of acquirers are willing to 
hold more stocks.  
During post-announcement period, cross-border M&A transactions slightly generate higher CAAR than 
domestic M&A ones. Shareholders of acquirers in cross-border M&A transactions earn about 0.44% 
CAAR, while those in domestic M&A transactions get 0.21% CAAR. However, only cross-border M&A 
generates a significant CAAR at 10% level.  
Table 7: CAARs of Acquirers by Cross-border/Domestic M&A transactions  
 
          
 
Cross-border M&As 
 
 
Domestic M&As 
 Time interval CAAR (%) t-value Z-value     
CAAR 
(%) t-value Z-value   
Pre-announcement period 
    
    (-5;-2) 1.96%     0.15       0.76  
  
2.26%    0.11      0.91  
 Announcement period 
        
(-1;0) 0.50%     0.05       1.41  *  
 
2.52%     0.28       2.96  ***  
Post-announcement period 
        
(+1;+5) 0.44%     0.03       1.41  *    0.21%     0.01  -    0.23    
***,** and * respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
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Methods of payment 
Table 8 describes CAARs of acquirers to the extent of methods of payment during three different time 
intervals. We examine the impacts of methods of payment by dividing the sample into two groups: cash 
and others. Cash group includes all M&A transactions financed by cash. Others group contains all M&A 
transactions financed by stock or combination of cash and stocks. Our sample includes 103 transactions, 
which are financed by cash, and 62 transactions, which are financed by other methods of payments. Other 
methods of payment can be stock finance or a combination of cash and stocks, from which 34 transactions 
are financed by stock and the remaining 28 transactions are financed by both stocks and cash.  
Method of payment does have impact on CAARs of acquirers. As can be seen from the table 8, during 
pre- and announcement period, all methods of payment produce positive CAARs for shareholders of 
acquirers. Except for M&A transactions using cash offer in pre-announcement period, which generate a 
small insignificant positive CAARs, non-parametric test shows that other CAARs for cash and other 
methods of payment are significant positive during these two periods. In the pre-announcement period, 
other methods of payment generate 4.23% CAAR IRUDFTXLUHUV¶VKDUHKROGHUV, which is statistically 
significant at 10% level. In the announcement period, M&A transactions with cash offer create 0.56% 
CAAR at 10% significant level for shareholders of acquirers, while other methods of payment generates a 
significant CAAR of 2.93%, at 1% level. As a result, we conclude that methods of payment impose 
effects on CAAR of acquirers during pre- and announcement periods. 
During these two periods, we can find that shareholders of M&A transactions, which use other methods 
of payment besides cash only, seem to be more beneficial than those using cash offer. CAARs generated 
from other methods of payment dominate those generated from cash offer, approximately over 5 times 
higher. Hence, M&A transactions with cash offer in Singapore do not offer higher abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquirers as indicated by most of previous studies. This finding is consistent with some 
studies such as Cheng (1998) or Ang and Cheng (2006). Therefore, current arguments seem to be 
appropriate to explain the behaviour of stock performance in Singapore. Shareholders of acquirers are 
afraid that the use of cash offer will cause financial distress to acquirers and limit the available funds for 
future investments. Moreover, they do not want to take entire risk and want to share the risk that expected 
synergy might not materialize with shareholders of target companies.  
On the other hand, over the period after M&A announcements are made, the impacts seem to be contrary. 
M&A transactions with cash offer generate a positive CAAR of 0.93% for shareholders of acquirers. 
However, shareholders of acquirers using other methods of payment earn a negative CAAR (-0.66%). 
CAAR from M&A transactions with cash offer tends to be higher than those with other offers in the post-
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announcement period, leading to an opposite result to those obtained for pre- and announcement periods. 
In addition, these CAARs are insignificant under both parametric and non-parametric tests. Therefore, 
methods of payment have no impacts on CAARs for shareholders of acquirers during post-announcement 
period.     
Table 8: CAARs of Acquirers by methods of payment 
   
          
 
Cash 
 
 
Others 
 Time interval CAAR (%) t-value Z-value     CAAR (%) t-value Z-value   
Pre-announcement period 
    
    (-5;-2) 0.81%     0.09       0.41  
  
4.23%     0.23      1.39   *  
Announcement period 
        
(-1;0) 0.56%     0.09       1.60  *  
 
2.93%     0.22       2.92  ***  
Post-announcement period 
        (+1;+5) 0.93%     0.10       1.20      -0.66% -   0.03  -    0.14    
***,** and * respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
 
Direction of mergers 
In our sample, during 8 years, there are 65 M&A transactions taken place between two companies 
operating in the same industry, while there are 100 M&A transactions between two companies from two 
different industries. Table 9 depicts CAARs of acquirers under two groups. The first group includes 
acquirers and target companies operating in the same industry group and the second group includes those 
operating in different industries group.  
In pre-announcement and announcement period, both groups show positive CAARs. During pre-
announcement period, M&A transactions under same industry group generate 1.82% CAAR, while those 
under different industries group produce a CAAR of 2.28%. Likewise, from day -1 to day 0, M&A 
transactions between two companies in the same industry bring about 1.18% CAAR, while M&A 
transactions between two companies from different industries generate a CAAR of 1.63%. However, only 
CAARs during announcement period are statistically significant different from zero. CAAR of M&A 
transactions in the same industry group is statistically significant at 10% level; meanwhile CAAR of 
M&A transactions in different industries group is significant at 1% level. Therefore, we can conclude 
that, during the announcement period from day -1 to the event day, direction of M&As does affect the 
CAAR of shareholders of acquirers. The positive CAAR for the same industry group supports the 
previous theory, stating that horizontal M&As will generate synergy and hence create value for 
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shareholders of acquirers. This result is in line with most of previous studies such as Bosveld, Meyer and 
Vorst (1997), which indicates both acquirer and target companies show positive CARs in horizontal 
M&As when examine Dutch M&A transactions in the period from 1979 to 1995. Nevertheless, the 
significant positive CAAR for M&A transactions between two companies operating in different industries 
is contrary with the previous theory, which indicates vertical and conglomerate M&As will produce 
negative or zero abnormal returns for shareholders of acquirers.  
On the other hand, during the post-announcement period, CAAR generated from M&A transactions in the 
same industry group exhibits a negative figure of -0.47%. Nevertheless, it is statistically insignificant. 
M&A transactions in different industries group create positive CAAR (0.85%) and this CAAR is also not 
significant. Therefore, this finding shows that direction of merger does not have any impacts on the 
performance of stocks during the post-announcement period. 
During pre-announcement, announcement, and post-announcement period, M&A transactions in different 
industries group not only produce positive CAARs, but also generate higher CAARs than those in the 
same industry group. It seems that M&A transactions between two companies operating in different 
industry group generate higher CAARs for shareholders of acquirers than those operating in the same 
industry group. This is different from most of previous theory and empirical studies, which states that 
industry focus strategy is better than diversifying strategy (Bruner, 2003).  
Table 9: CAARs of Acquirers by direction of M&As 
   
          
 
Same industry 
 
 
Different industries 
 Time interval CAAR (%) t-value Z-value     CAAR (%) t-value Z-value   
Pre-announcement period 
    
    (-5;-2) 1.82%     0.17       0.14  
  
2.28%     0.17       1.40  
 Announcement period 
        
(-1;0) 1.18%     0.16       1.64  *  
 
1.63%     0.17       2.61  ***  
Post-announcement period 
        (+1;+5) -0.47% -   0.04       1.14      0.85%     0.06       0.19    
***,** and * respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level  
 
In general, we can conclude that M&A announcement do have impacts on the shareholder value of 
acquirers during the announcement period. This effect on CAAR is significant and consistent in 
throughout different determinants of CAARs: cross-border/domestic M&As, methods of payment or 
directions of mergers.  
40 
 
Regression result 
To confirm the results obtained from the previous tests about the impacts of determinants on abnormal 
returns for shareholder value of acquirers, we do multivariate test on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
We examine three different determinants, which are cross-border/domestic M&A, methods of payment 
and direction of mergers, in three time intervals as previous tests. The results of the test are presented in 
table 10. 
Table 10: Determinants of Short-term wealth effects for Acquirers 
  CAR(-5;-2) CAR(-1;0) CAR(+1;+5) 
Independent variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Į 0.0417*** (2.64) 0.0356*** (3.32) -0.00160 (-0.07) 
Cross-border 0.00591 (0.35) -0.0154 (-1.32) 0.000410 (0.02) 
Cash -0.0355** (-2.03) -0.0197* (-1.66) 0.0163 (0.68) 
Same industry -0.00419 (-0.25) -0.00160 (-0.14) -0.0139 (-0.60) 
***,** and * respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level        
              
N 165 
 
165 
 
165 
 R-squared 0.0256 
 
0.0363 
 
0.0051 
 adj. R-sq 0.007 
 
0.018 
 
-0.013 
 F-statistics 0.2427 
 
0.1131 
 
0.8436 
  
During the pre-announcement period, cross-border M&A shows a positive relationship with CAR, while 
cash payment and same industry show negative relationships with CARs for shareholders of acquirers. 
However, only cash determinant shows a significant result at 5% level. This confirms the finding from 
previous section, showing that methods of payment affect the abnormal returns for shareholders of 
acquirers during the pre-announcement period. 
During announcement date, three determinants exhibit negative relationships with CARs. Among these 
determinants, method of payment is the only one, which shows significant relationship at 10% level. This 
finding is consistent with the previous section stating that during the announcement period, the methods 
of financing M&A transactions will affect shareholder value of acquirers.  
During post-announcement period, cross-border and cash payment show positive relationship with CARs, 
while M&A transactions between two companies in the same industry show negative relationship with 
CAR. However, none of those determinants is statistically significant from zero. This finding is consistent 
with the finding from univariate tests for methods of payment and direction of merger, from which the 
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conclusion of no relationship between these two determinants and returns to shareholders during post-
announcement period is achieved. 
In sum, from this regression, we find that method of payment has impacts on stock performance of 
acquirers during pre-announcement and announcement period. This finding from the regression is 
consistent with the result from univariate tests for method of payment. On the other hand, while univariate 
tests conclude that cross-border or domestic M&A transactions and direction of mergers impose effects 
on stock performance during pre-announcement and announcement period; regression results imply that 
these two determinants do not affect the CAR for shareholders of acquirers in any time period. 
Delimitation 
Like any other studies, this thesis contains some delimitation:  
First, this thesis takes into consideration only M&A transactions taken place during eight years from 2000 
to 2007. Hence, the results of this research cannot represent for M&A transactions in Singapore all the 
time. The reason for it is noted by Smit (2005), who identifies that the market for M&A transactions 
changes over time and depends on distinct waves.  
Similarly, this thesis focuses only on M&A transactions of companies in Singapore. Hence, it cannot 
represent for other countries and regions.  
The examined period is not long enough; hence, the effects of M&As to Singapore acquirers may not be 
apparent. From 2000 to 2007, Asian markets were facing with the break of IT bubbles, so price of most 
stocks fluctuated dramatically. Additionally, Singapore is an opening market and relates closely to global 
economic environment. Therefore, Singapore stock prices will drop as the result of financial crisis and the 
result may be affected by the financial crisis.      
Moreover, this thesis focuses only on the short-run effect of M&A announcement to stock performance 
and on acquiring companies. Hence, it leaves out the long-run effects and effects on target companies.  
In addition, this thesis examines M&A transactions whose total announced value is greater than S$1 
million. Therefore, the result cannot reflect the impact of M&A announcement in smaller transactions.  
This thesis analyses M&A transactions in different industries, so it may ignore the possibility that M&A 
transactions could be value creation for some certain industry sectors, while concurrently value destroying 
in other industry sectors.  
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Finally, this sample only considers those acquirers, which are listed on Singapore Stock Exchange. 
Accordingly, it ignored M&A transactions made by unlisted companies. 
Conclusion    
Mergers and acquisitions are becoming not only popular in US and European developed countries, they 
are now expanding to Asian market, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. However, there are 
few studies about M&As for Asian markets. That is why; this thesis will particularly investigate the 
impacts of M&A announcement on shareholder value for acquiring companies in a country of Asian 
markets. That is Singapore. This thesis examines 165 M&A transactions in Singapore during the period 
from 2000 to 2007 to see whether M&A announcements have any impacts on value of shareholders of 
acquirers in short run. Furthermore, this thesis also investigate three determinants, which are cross-
border/domestic M&As, methods of payment and direction of mergers, to find out any relationship 
between those determinants and abnormal returns for shareholders of acquirers. We investigate the 
sample in three different periods: pre-announcement period (-5;-2), announcement period (-1;0) and post-
announcement period (+1;+5). By employing event study methodology, we found the following results: 
During the pre- and post-announcement period, there exist positive cumulative abnormal returns of 2.10% 
and 0.33% for shareholders of acquirers. However, these numbers are not statistically significant. Hence, 
we cannot reject the null of no abnormal return generated from M&A announcements to acquirers for 
these two periods. In contrast, during the announcement period, there exists a significant positive 
cumulative abnormal return for shareholders of acquirers at 1% level. This indicates that the stock 
performance of acquirers in response to M&A announcement in Singapore is positive. Therefore, M&A 
announcements can be seen as good news to shareholders of acquirers during announcement period from 
day -1 to day 0.  
In the second part of this thesis, we investigate three factors that may impose impacts on shareholder 
value of acquirers. They are cross-border/domestic M&As, methods of payment and direction of mergers. 
To find out their relationships with abnormal returns for acquirers, we employ both univariate and 
multivariate tests. Using univariate test, we find out as followings: 
In examining whether abnormal returns of acquirers will be affected by cross-border or domestic M&As, 
we estimate separately CAARs that shareholders of acquirers earn if M&A transactions are cross-border 
or domestic. We found that during pre-announcement period, there is no significant evidence to conclude 
that M&A announcements generate abnormal returns for acquirers under both cross-border and domestic 
M&A transactions. During announcement period, both cross-border and domestic M&A transactions 
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create positive and significant CAARs for shareholders of acquirers. CAAR generated by cross-border 
M&A transactions is 0.5% and statistically significant at 10% level, while CAAR generated by domestic 
ones is 2.52% and significant at 1% level. Thus, we can conclude that Singapore acquirers acquire 
domestic target companies can generate positive abnormal returns as those acquire foreign target 
companies and domestic M&A transactions even seem to produce higher abnormal returns than cross-
border ones. In post-announcement period, cross-border M&A transactions generate a positive CAAR of 
0.44% for acquirers, at 10% significant level; while domestic M&A deals generate insignificant CAAR. 
In order to find out the relationship between methods of payment and abnormal returns to shareholders of 
acquirers, we split our sample into cash and others group. Cash group includes all M&A transactions for 
which acquirers use cash to finance, whereas others group includes the other M&A transactions for which 
acquirers use stocks or combination of stock and cash to finance. The result shows that during pre-
announcement period, transactions using other methods of payment generate significant CAAR at 10%, 
while CAAR of transactions with cash offer is not significant different from zero. Announcement period 
remarks significant CAARs for all M&A transactions using cash and other modes of payment. 
Shareholders of Cash offer receive 0.56% CAAR at 10% significant level. Similarly, shareholders of 
other methods of payment earn 2.93% at 1% significant level. Hence, both groups generate positive 
significant abnormal returns for shareholders and other methods of payment seem to create higher value 
for shareholders. During pre-announcement period, none of them shows significant abnormal returns for 
acquirers.  
Finally, we examine the impacts of direction of mergers on abnormal returns for shareholders of acquirers 
by estimating the CAARs generated by M&A transactions between companies in the same industry and 
those transactions between companies in different industries. We find that during pre-announcement 
period, none of them shows CAARs which are significantly different from zero. During the 
announcement period, M&A transactions between companies in the same industry group will generate a 
positive CAAR of 1.18% and significant at 10% level. Similarly, if acquirers acquire target companies in 
different industries relative to them, shareholders of acquirers receive a significant CAAR of 1.63%, at 
1% level. M&A transactions between acquirers and target companies operating in different industries 
seem to dominate those of M&A transactions companies in the same industry. During post-announcement 
period, we find no evidence to conclude that directions of mergers impose any impact on abnormal 
returns for shareholders of acquirers.  
To confirm the univariate test, we conduct regression between cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in 
different time intervals and three determinants. We find that only methods of payment show a significant 
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relationship with CARs. In pre-announcement period, cash offer has a significant relationship with CARs 
of acquirers at 5% level. In announcement period, cash offer also shows a significant negative 
relationship with CARs at 10% level. This result supports again the result of univariate test, indicating 
that the choice of payment methods of acquirers will affect the abnormal return generated for 
shareholders of acquirers in pre- and announcement periods.  
From the above results, we can answer research questions: 
x Will the M&A announcement create or destroy shareholder wealth of Singapore acquirers in 
short run? 
M&A announcement will create shareholder wealth for Singapore acquirers in the short run, 
particularly during announcement period from the day before announcement until the day 
announcements are actually made. 
x How is the relationship between three factors (domestic/cross-border M&A, methods of 
payment, directions of mergers) and the performance of stocks?  
Cross-border M&A transactions will generate positive abnormal returns for shareholders of 
acquirers in announcement period and post-announcement period, while domestic M&A transactions 
will create positive abnormal returns during announcement period. 
Methods of payment are evidenced to have impact on shareholder value. No matter acquirers finance 
M&A transactions by cash or other methods of payment (stocks or combination of stocks and cash), 
shareholders of acquirers will receive positive abnormal returns during pre- and announcement 
periods. 
Directions of mergers also affect the abnormal returns generated for shareholders of Singapore 
acquirers. No matter what directions Singapore M&A transactions employ, acquiring target 
companies in the same industry or in a different industry relative to acquirers, shareholders of 
acquirers will receive positive abnormal returns during announcement period.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Average abnormal returns of Singapore acquirers 
        
 Day   AAR     Day   AAR    
 
Day   AAR  
-205 0.0018541 
 
-134 0.0037096 
 
-63 0.0070126 
-204 0.0035383 
 
-133 -0.0021728 
 
-62 0.0006967 
-203 0.0060179 
 
-132 -0.0027098 
 
-61 -0.0052935 
-202 0.0020873 
 
-131 0.0077402 
 
-60 0.0039097 
-201 0.000053 
 
-130 -0.0013031 
 
-59 -0.0007365 
-200 0.0026361 
 
-129 0.0064339 
 
-58 0.0007447 
-199 0.0052486 
 
-128 -0.000685 
 
-57 0.0008441 
-198 0.0021705 
 
-127 -0.0027764 
 
-56 0.0001191 
-197 0.0008518 
 
-126 0.0049912 
 
-55 0.0079436 
-196 -0.0058231 
 
-125 -0.0045182 
 
-54 0.0028202 
-195 -0.0022944 
 
-124 0.0021302 
 
-53 -0.0038773 
-194 0.0058973 
 
-123 -0.0002547 
 
-52 0.0072791 
-193 0.019857 
 
-122 -0.0031116 
 
-51 0.0049813 
-192 -0.0045033 
 
-121 -0.0013382 
 
-50 0.0017028 
-191 0.0046928 
 
-120 -0.0010443 
 
-49 0.0011879 
-190 0.0035387 
 
-119 0.0019837 
 
-48 0.0038795 
-189 0.001997 
 
-118 0.0013872 
 
-47 -0.001271 
-188 0.0001118 
 
-117 -0.0004263 
 
-46 0.0033162 
-187 -0.0007309 
 
-116 0.0053419 
 
-45 0.006239 
-186 -0.000344 
 
-115 -0.0048271 
 
-44 0.0000121 
-185 0.0082918 
 
-114 0.009649 
 
-43 0.0005388 
-184 -0.0014639 
 
-113 0.0023806 
 
-42 -0.0018999 
-183 0.0011062 
 
-112 -0.0049877 
 
-41 0.0012111 
-182 -0.000294 
 
-111 0.0057236 
 
-40 0.0079172 
-181 -0.0009107 
 
-110 -0.0027604 
 
-39 0.0052968 
-180 -0.0004184 
 
-109 0.0033778 
 
-38 -0.0019491 
-179 -0.0043183 
 
-108 0.000661 
 
-37 0.0037781 
-178 0.0053598 
 
-107 0.0075672 
 
-36 0.006144 
-177 -0.0061916 
 
-106 -0.0026034 
 
-35 0.0003113 
-176 -0.0012517 
 
-105 -0.0043676 
 
-34 0.0009358 
-175 0.0048506 
 
-104 -0.0000805 
 
-33 -0.0040277 
-174 -0.0032162 
 
-103 0.0057787 
 
-32 0.001374 
-173 -0.0004233 
 
-102 0.0001706 
 
-31 -0.0042788 
-172 0.005349 
 
-101 -0.0029559 
 
-30 0.0041063 
-171 0.0051614 
 
-100 0.0045284 
 
-29 0.0048421 
-170 0.0001425 
 
-99 0.0050769 
 
-28 0.0026995 
-169 -0.0059441 
 
-98 -0.0004218 
 
-27 0.0005673 
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-168 0.0015333 
 
-97 0.0010088 
 
-26 0.0045632 
-167 0.0074627 
 
-96 0.0071849 
 
-25 -0.0013238 
-166 0.0010361 
 
-95 0.0052391 
 
-24 0.0048388 
-165 -0.0070818 
 
-94 -0.0060349 
 
-23 -0.0011531 
-164 -0.0024103 
 
-93 -0.0004214 
 
-22 0.0016049 
-163 0.0060025 
 
-92 0.0039824 
 
-21 -0.0011929 
-162 -0.0026152 
 
-91 0.0031455 
 
-20 0.0031561 
-161 -0.0026861 
 
-90 -0.0062733 
 
-19 -0.0014021 
-160 0.0012367 
 
-89 0.0030518 
 
-18 0.0084231 
-159 -0.0017213 
 
-88 0.0033488 
 
-17 -0.0039219 
-158 0.0083284 
 
-87 0.0045251 
 
-16 0.0091906 
-157 0.0022659 
 
-86 -0.0000257 
 
-15 -0.0022572 
-156 -0.0047726 
 
-85 0.0040107 
 
-14 0.0057844 
-155 0.0009054 
 
-84 0.002959 
 
-13 0.0060537 
-154 -0.0010665 
 
-83 0.0127924 
 
-12 -0.0038132 
-153 -0.0023633 
 
-82 0.0036556 
 
-11 0.0015507 
-152 0.0021185 
 
-81 -0.0025221 
 
-10 -0.0049608 
-151 0.0054906 
 
-80 -0.0032073 
 
-9 0.0041788 
-150 -0.0007612 
 
-79 0.0000369 
 
-8 0.0035648 
-149 0.0026804 
 
-78 0.0082998 
 
-7 0.0038366 
-148 -0.0000246 
 
-77 -0.0084608 
 
-6 0.0047453 
-147 0.0037146 
 
-76 0.0033658 
 
-5 0.0059281 
-146 -0.0009025 
 
-75 -0.0023977 
 
-4 0.0078557 
-145 0.0057381 
 
-74 0.0013185 
 
-3 0.0025236 
-144 -0.0066509 
 
-73 -0.0038153 
 
-2 0.0046869 
-143 0.0046068 
 
-72 0.0001159 
 
-1 0.0145477 
-142 -0.0004656 
 
-71 0.0003457 
 
0 -0.0000204 
-141 0.0020494 
 
-70 -0.0009868 
 
1 0.0137002 
-140 -0.0016796 
 
-69 -0.0038104 
 
2 0.0040907 
-139 0.0035562 
 
-68 -0.0048277 
 
3 -0.006004 
-138 0.0011151 
 
-67 0.0027154 
 
4 -0.0065129 
-137 0.0015214 
 
-66 -0.0006944 
 
5 -0.0019602 
-136 0.0010502 
 
-65 -0.0075486 
   
-135 0.0020822 
 
-64 0.0081945 
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Appendix 2: Cumulative abnormal returns of Singapore acquirers 
      id event_date  CAR(-5;-2)   CAR(-1;0)   CAR(+1;+5)  
 1 21/11/2007 -0.1017996 -0.0788172 0.0385182 
 2 04/03/2003 -0.0195341 0.0354278 -0.0750673 
 3 14/03/2003 -0.0457887 -0.0122179 0.0154853 
 4 18/06/2003 0.0359598 -0.0402097 0.0545458 
 5 05/03/2001 -0.1057313 0.0034029 0.0205629 
 6 01/03/2002 0.0071325 0.0263338 0.1509437 
 7 05/07/2007 0.0832136 -0.0100925 -0.1103635 
 8 27/10/2006 -0.1599572 0.1604042 0.0401312 
 9 18/10/2004 -0.0483538 0.0004394 -0.0024443 
 10 16/03/2007 0.0120243 -0.0031064 1.350834 
 11 30/11/2007 0.0027751 -0.0449001 -0.0101665 
 12 23/03/2001 0.0205364 0.0101305 0.0102296 
 13 17/09/2002 0.0237171 -0.0320375 0.0276014 
 14 04/05/2004 -0.0903724 0.0199408 -0.0266179 
 15 28/06/2002 -0.0091629 0.0434182 0.0281255 
 16 30/09/2005 -0.0173225 -0.0086782 0.0150431 
 17 19/01/2001 -0.0345246 0.0045183 0.0814421 
 18 07/12/2007 0.0176216 -0.0095615 0.0604288 
 19 10/03/2002 0.053352 -0.026007 -0.029713 
 20 23/05/2007 0.0258448 0.0413959 0.3193092 
 21 15/04/2005 0.05857 -0.0286201 -0.0450326 
 22 31/08/2007 0.0185314 0.0278089 -0.0245847 
 23 04/10/2000 -0.0047786 -0.0221399 -0.0060642 
 24 11/07/2006 0.0218875 -0.006717 0.0613153 
 25 12/11/2007 -0.0035448 -0.0116497 0.0121187 
 26 19/12/2003 -0.0011001 0.0566707 -0.010601 
 27 11/07/2005 -0.0708889 0.070342 0.0032526 
 28 18/04/2001 -0.0115498 0.0337004 -0.0088258 
 29 16/09/2004 -0.0013643 0.031588 -0.0136862 
 30 01/09/2006 -0.0097303 -0.0249286 0.0299812 
 31 19/11/2003 -0.1505859 0.0476562 -0.0253359 
 32 04/05/2007 -0.0823342 -0.0984489 0.0125834 
 33 03/07/2002 0.0072045 -0.019168 0.0120459 
 34 19/09/2006 0.0528757 -0.0205732 -0.0254053 
 35 23/11/2004 -0.0948755 0.0000736 0.2375142 
 36 22/11/2004 -0.0566681 0.0178457 0.0819749 
 37 01/12/2006 0.0317691 -0.0150922 -0.0406247 
 38 19/12/2002 0.6183928 0.0529629 -0.1566786 
 39 09/10/2000 -0.0319063 0.059787 -0.0493316 
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40 30/10/2001 0.0135736 -0.0258979 0.1311851 
 41 12/07/2002 0.1335681 0.0360892 -0.081886 
 42 25/01/2007 -0.0250949 0.0105377 -0.0765538 
 43 05/09/2000 -0.0188907 0.0225577 -0.0183628 
 44 18/02/2003 0.0077315 0.0347406 -0.093057 
 45 01/12/2004 -0.0085115 -0.0154716 0.0130075 
 46 15/10/2003 0.035903 0.0460099 0.0049997 
 47 16/01/2007 0.0487244 0.1211416 -0.1483233 
 48 17/10/2003 0.0421205 -0.011869 -0.0142012 
 49 29/07/2004 -0.0318633 -0.0307721 0.0214711 
 50 26/09/2003 -0.0364065 0.0246321 -0.1010728 
 51 16/08/2001 -0.0051921 -0.0170505 0.0000972 
 52 24/09/2005 0.0048211 0.1299126 -0.0209448 
 53 17/10/2005 -0.0070559 0.1709107 -0.115083 
 54 13/06/2006 -0.0831581 0.0694553 0.0374583 
 55 28/05/2007 -0.037979 0.0039889 0.040857 
 56 08/06/2005 0.1393129 -0.0409097 0.0344341 
 57 23/02/2007 -0.0109875 0.353634 -0.258056 
 58 18/10/2002 -0.0405637 -0.0141231 0.0070455 
 59 17/03/2004 0.0319929 0.0022367 0.0078689 
 60 26/10/2006 -0.0184131 -0.015471 -0.0093128 
 61 31/01/2001 0.0193387 0.0384679 0.0033492 
 62 31/07/2001 0.0033227 -0.0060393 0.0876362 
 63 04/08/2004 -0.0090605 0.1304478 -0.2036185 
 64 28/10/2004 0.0197798 0.009261 -0.031949 
 65 10/07/2007 -0.002606 -0.0020482 -0.0074522 
 66 30/10/2001 -0.0137453 0.0612274 -0.0532886 
 67 02/01/2004 0.0150512 -0.0139153 0.0778298 
 68 21/03/2007 0.0354293 0.0118612 0.027499 
 69 17/09/2003 0.1143288 -0.0651619 -0.106579 
 70 28/10/2002 0.0246322 0.0127006 0.004934 
 71 29/11/2004 0.0763196 0.0238924 -0.0515466 
 72 10/07/2007 0.0613294 0.046653 0.2483904 
 73 26/01/2006 0.1449376 0.0087775 0.1783202 
 74 09/07/2001 -0.0189398 0.019666 0.0002563 
 75 17/03/2005 -0.0146886 0.0252241 0.0047707 
 76 20/03/2002 -0.0004198 -0.0048437 0.0051364 
 77 25/05/2005 -0.0317947 0.0276165 0.0126367 
 78 23/01/2003 0.0197319 0.0014649 0.013422 
 79 04/06/2007 -0.0052017 0.0254476 0.0084058 
 80 20/01/2003 -0.0100089 0.0193581 -0.1236573 
 81 12/07/2000 0.1188598 0.0093469 -0.1053259 
 82 27/06/2002 -0.0293525 0.0174522 0.0732035 
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83 10/05/2005 -0.0165754 -0.0020008 0.0762987 
 84 17/02/2005 0.0341894 -0.0028903 -0.0072473 
 85 04/01/2006 -0.0071585 0.0201127 0.0986128 
 86 25/07/2002 0.0107694 0.0272689 -0.0860577 
 87 27/10/2003 0.2555552 0.0105795 -0.2508051 
 88 04/10/2004 0.0152467 0.0077074 0.0416512 
 89 14/05/2003 0.0945014 -0.0138492 -0.0309725 
 90 07/07/2004 0.2294908 -0.0459146 -0.1886751 
 91 24/08/2006 0.0219179 0.009473 -0.0404645 
 92 23/10/2003 -0.0124071 0.0336411 -0.0265988 
 93 25/06/2001 -0.0001226 -0.0037541 -0.0106885 
 94 27/04/2006 -0.0377402 0.0351646 -0.0338632 
 95 16/10/2003 0.0824154 0.008797 0.0200474 
 96 04/01/2006 0.1054642 -0.0364765 -0.0318129 
 97 30/06/2007 -0.0191892 -0.0036904 -0.0996672 
 98 16/11/2004 -0.0113336 -0.0146907 0.0010337 
 99 15/03/2005 0.0085507 -0.0075063 -0.0019317 
 100 21/12/2005 -0.0027624 0.4445415 -0.1068882 
 101 21/10/2004 -0.0176234 0.1817172 -0.1864123 
 102 07/06/2005 -0.2676887 -0.0052688 0.111891 
 103 07/11/2005 -0.0108307 -0.0084249 -0.0053688 
 104 22/07/2006 -0.0072003 -0.0877834 -0.0213212 
 105 29/08/2000 0.0935413 -0.0218403 -0.0888717 
 106 13/09/2002 -0.0751521 -0.0275084 0.015795 
 107 24/03/2003 -0.018488 0.0263997 -0.0444176 
 108 21/04/2006 0.039977 0.0688173 0.0187513 
 109 29/03/2004 -0.0007899 -0.0020005 0.0041915 
 110 02/11/2007 0.4445806 0.1229764 -0.134264 
 111 01/06/2006 0.1013558 0.0085631 0.0065626 
 112 17/10/2006 0.0388151 0.1023507 0.1299696 
 113 24/01/2007 -0.0302847 -0.0580546 0.0059345 
 114 09/06/2006 0.0780475 0.0031263 -0.07643 
 115 03/10/2005 0.032121 0.0667221 0.0814334 
 116 07/05/2007 -0.0096334 -0.0085458 -0.1069215 
 117 02/04/2006 0.1487921 0.1493768 -0.0199998 
 118 01/10/2007 0.0113125 0.0507656 -0.0450913 
 119 04/12/2002 0.0029784 -0.0482235 -0.0046485 
 120 26/04/2006 -0.0730392 0.0177652 -0.0671831 
 121 17/10/2007 -0.0201155 0.0031255 0.0082574 
 122 28/04/2006 -0.0236072 -0.0018881 0.0037455 
 123 01/10/2001 -0.0345099 0.002996 -0.0264463 
 124 13/07/2007 0.0841199 -0.0244271 -0.0800501 
 125 08/05/2007 -0.0173715 0.0568559 -0.0783177 
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126 15/09/2004 0.0345855 -0.0200228 0.0977192 
 127 07/08/2006 -0.0191942 0.0061804 -0.341119 
 128 13/07/2002 0.0155297 -0.0026448 0.1386934 
 129 14/12/2006 -0.033309 -0.0614862 0.2158482 
 130 02/02/2006 0.0384347 -0.0304468 -0.0300712 
 131 22/11/2005 0.0281141 0.0054242 -0.0186538 
 132 11/12/2006 -0.031142 -0.02347 -0.0795749 
 133 26/03/2001 0.0332006 -0.0950602 -0.1520601 
 134 23/09/2002 0.0007989 0.0148038 -0.0122714 
 135 28/09/2004 0.5018451 -0.3354321 0.1524538 
 136 29/05/2006 0.1946702 -0.1577715 0.3452156 
 137 01/08/2007 0.0013089 -0.0230788 -0.1320591 
 138 21/09/2004 -0.0062632 -0.0004848 0.0965556 
 139 08/10/2004 -0.0118819 -0.0813829 0.0296639 
 140 05/10/2005 0.0049996 -0.0083748 0.0035528 
 141 17/05/2007 0.1015589 0.0591377 0.0059046 
 142 25/01/2007 -0.155617 0.0077545 0.0034229 
 143 03/11/2000 -0.012359 0.0111516 0.0456246 
 144 05/07/2004 -0.0075976 0.0014244 -0.0052784 
 145 11/03/2006 -0.3374215 0.1632251 -0.0042961 
 146 24/08/2007 -0.1609585 0.050381 -0.000508 
 147 04/07/2002 -0.0113954 0.0021572 0.0548349 
 148 15/11/2001 0.3057574 -0.039477 0.2890061 
 149 22/10/2003 0.2408102 0.0683761 -0.0422173 
 150 16/06/2006 0.1899169 -0.0325354 -0.0451389 
 151 28/10/2007 0.0638677 -0.0637192 -0.1856913 
 152 24/08/2004 0.178938 -0.0514722 -0.0772462 
 153 15/03/2004 0.1642381 0.11103 -0.1526605 
 154 19/05/2006 -0.0115473 -0.0017266 -0.0320744 
 155 15/06/2007 -0.0150852 0.0838755 -0.0154439 
 156 31/01/2002 0.059002 -0.0062242 -0.1022279 
 157 20/01/2004 -0.0440572 -0.0129218 -0.0171057 
 158 19/09/2003 -0.0053853 0.144284 -0.0062646 
 159 07/10/2002 0.1251637 0.0904732 0.0978163 
 160 09/07/2004 0.1243559 0.0029586 0.018271 
 161 30/08/2001 -0.0045192 0.0843319 -0.1525524 
 162 15/07/2003 0.1504848 0.0261955 0.2111968 
 163 06/05/2002 0.0334905 -0.0239832 -0.0019466 
 164 17/08/2005 -0.0446289 0.0059917 0.1620546 
 165 05/10/2001 -0.0251742 0.0134297 0.0352581 
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